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INTRODUCTION 
The history of business reorganization under the bankruptcy law in 
the United States, similar to other areas of law, demonstrates the use 
of innovative and creative techniques to achieve the intended 
objectives and policies of a particular statute.1  Rarely is a statute 
enacted that encompasses all potential scenarios that may thereafter 
arise and affect its stated and perceived goals.  The application of 
statutory provisions necessarily involves the construction of their 
words in the context of the purposes and policies of the legislation. 
Perhaps there is no area of law more dynamic and needful of 
enlightened and flexible construction than bankruptcy 
reorganization.  Bankruptcy reorganizations present socio-economic 
circumstances and processes that are layered with multiple parties 
                                                          
 1. See John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2969 (1999) (commenting on the 
evolution of Bankruptcy Law in the United States since its humble beginnings in the 
early 19th Century). 
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and diverse interests.  Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act in 1978, reorganization professionals have grappled with the 
construction of Bankruptcy Code provisions in order to affect the 
underlying principles and policies of that statute.  In the specific area 
of Chapter 11 reorganizations, the effort has been devoted to 
achieving the confirmation of a reorganization plan that would 
rehabilitate a debtor’s business and maximize the value of the 
debtor’s estate for the benefit of its economic stakeholders.2  
Attainment of the statutory objectives has required a flexible 
approach to the interpretation and application of the Bankruptcy 
Code.3  The creativity of professionals has been of significant 
importance in persuading courts to construe and apply the 
Bankruptcy Code and its related statutory provisions in a manner that 
satisfies the legislation’s objectives. 
The confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization may 
present circumstances that call for creative thinking and 
constructions that serve the process of reorganization.  The 
challenges become more acute in the context of confirming a 
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization over the objection of a class of 
dissenting creditors through the use of the “cramdown” power.4  The 
cramdown power implicates the Fair and Equitable Rule or Absolute 
Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, which are 
incorporated into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.5  The 
Absolute Priority Rule is a vertical test designed to ensure that no 
creditor or interest junior to the objecting class of creditors receives 
any consideration under the plan on account of such junior claims or 
interests if the objecting class of creditors is not paid in full.6  The 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition is a horizontal test designed to 
ensure that no class of equal priority or standing to the objecting 
class of creditors receives a consideration under the plan that is 
                                                          
 2. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship., 526 U.S. 
434, 453 (1999) (recognizing that the two goals of Chapter 11 are “preserving going 
concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”). 
 3. See William C. Whitford, What’s Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 
1406 (1994) (proclaiming that the malleability of Chapter 11 is one of its greatest 
virtues). 
 4. See infra Part I.B (discussing the requirement for plan approval via 
“cramdown”). 
 5. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition and the 
Absolute Priority Rule set forth in section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 6. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall 
and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988) (providing 
an overview of the Absolute Priority Rule). 
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better than the consideration provided for the objecting class of 
creditors.7 
Although the policies underlying the Absolute Priority Rule and 
the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition are self-evident, often these 
two rules are confused and impair the ability of parties to reach 
consensus.  In some circumstances, creditors may want to give equity 
interest holders some consideration in order to retain the old 
management to continue to operate and manage the reorganized 
business, or they may want to give a particular class of creditors 
additional consideration to avoid threatened litigation by that class or 
for other reasons.  A strict construction of the cramdown 
requirements may lead to the conclusion that such arrangements 
cannot be sanctioned if there is an objecting class of creditors. 
Flexibility and creativity on the part of the professionals and the 
courts often become imperative and necessary to affect the 
reorganization of distressed businesses and deal fairly with the parties 
in interest.  Relying on a line of cases that permitted a secured 
creditor to share collateral proceeds with other classes of creditors, 
plan proponents have argued and reasoned that if an enhanced 
recovery to one class of claims or interest were necessary to effect the 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan and that enhanced recovery was 
provided by a non-debtor, e.g., a vendor, from that non-debtor’s 
recovery or property, the Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition should not prevent confirmation of the 
plan.  Thus came to be the “gifting” doctrine.8  It developed 
incrementally.  Initially a secured creditor shared the proceeds from 
its collateral security with unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7 
liquidation case.9  Then, a secured creditor shared proceeds from its 
collateral security with unsecured creditors in the context of a 
Chapter 11 plan.10  Next, a secured creditor shared proceeds from its 
collateral security with equity interest holders as part of the 
consummation of a plan.11  Finally, a class of unsecured creditors 
proposed to share with an equity interest holder a portion of its 
distribution in order to confirm a plan of reorganization and not 
                                                          
 7. See generally Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in 
Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 228 (1998) (examining the origins of the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition). 
 8. See infra Part III (tracing the history of the gifting doctrine). 
 9. See infra Part III.B (discussing Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Committee v. 
Stern (In re SPM Manufacturing. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 10. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1994 WL 
842777 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994)). 
 11. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 
591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)). 
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implicate the Absolute Priority Rule or the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition.12  It is this most recent expansion of the gifting doctrine 
that is the primary subject of this Article. 
Courts have generally permitted gifting arrangements by citing to 
the cases that have approved similar schemes, with the recognition, 
perhaps, that creative deal-making that enables a distressed debtor to 
emerge from Chapter 11 as a reorganized economic unit is a good 
result.  Unfortunately, it appears that the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit has squelched the creative efforts to facilitate 
Chapter 11 plan confirmations by its textually oriented decision in In 
re Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (Armstrong II).13  In that decision the 
Third Circuit held that a Chapter 11 plan pursuant to which one class 
of unsecured creditors gifted a portion of its plan consideration to an 
equity interest holder while another class of unsecured creditors of 
co-equal priority was to receive less than 100% satisfaction of their 
claims violated the Absolute Priority Rule.14  The Armstrong opinion 
may have the effect of limiting potential constructive plan structures 
used by reorganization professionals to achieve consensus among 
substantially all of the diverse interests that may be involved in a 
Chapter 11 reorganization.  The decision of the Third Circuit may 
encourage hold-out behavior by objecting creditors who may 
complain about an agreement for the transfer of consideration by 
one creditor class of claims or interests to junior classes, even though 
the transfer has no direct effect on the value to be received by the 
objecting creditors. 
This Article discusses Armstrong in the context of the history of the 
Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.  It 
concludes that the Chapter 11 plan in Armstrong, and in similar cases 
that used creative structuring to achieve substantial consensus as to 
the distribution of value, should be encouraged as consistent with 
both the objectives and the literal language of Chapter 11.  This 
Article contends that the Third Circuit was wrong in its conclusion 
that the gifting in Armstrong violated the Absolute Priority Rule.  
Alternatively, to the extent that the Absolute Priority Rule or the 
                                                          
 12. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 320 B.R. 523 (E.D. Pa. 2004), aff’d, 432 
F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 13. 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 14. Id.  The proposed description of warrants to the Class 12 claimant and 
ultimately to Armstrong Holdings, Inc. would have resulted in a distribution of the 
warrants to the public stockholders of Armstrong Holdings, Inc.  As described in the 
Disclosure Statement, Armstrong Holdings, Inc., the public company, was to be 
liquidated.  That liquidation would result in the distribution of the warrants to the 
Holdings’ stockholders.  Id. 
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Unfair Discrimination Prohibition can be read to prohibit gifting as 
proposed in Armstrong, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code 
to permit explicitly such gifting. 
Part I of this Article discusses the policy and process of Chapter 11 
plan confirmation.  Part II of the Article discusses the history of the 
Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.  
Part III discusses the evolution of the gifting doctrine in the cases 
leading up to Armstrong.  Part IV discusses the Armstrong decision and 
the reasons why it was erroneously decided. 
I.  BANKRUPTCY CODE POLICY AND CONFIRMATION REQUIREMENTS 
The sine qua non of Chapter 11 reorganization is the engagement 
and negotiation among parties in interest with the ultimate goal of a 
consensual plan of reorganization.15  The Bankruptcy Code sets the 
rules of the game.  The rules are designed to assist the 
implementation of the principle of equality of distribution to 
creditors of equal rank in accordance with their legal rights.  
Nonetheless, within the statutory provisions there is elasticity for 
innovative solutions to accommodate parties in interest as may be 
necessary to achieve plan confirmation.  For years creative 
restructuring professionals have pushed the bounds of the 
Bankruptcy Code to achieve the objectives of reorganization.  These 
attempts have met with mixed results.  Taking into account that 
bankruptcy reorganization is a zero-sum game, valuation is a critical 
factor for participation in the reorganization.  Therefore, the party 
outside the value band often will seek a means to upset the 
agreement among other parties in the hope of extracting value for 
itself.16  Dissidents will argue that the negotiated proposed plan fails 
to meet the confirmation requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Adversary proceedings ensue and the issues often wind their way 
through the appellate courts. 
Generally in all matters involving the law, where a party stands 
depends upon where it falls in the hierarchy of claims or interest.  
The individual attorneys in a relatively small bankruptcy bar often 
find themselves, alternatively, arguing for broad or narrow 
constructions of the Bankruptcy Code depending upon whether their 
                                                          
 15. See Ali M.M. Mojdehi, Appraising Postconfirmation Leaders:  The Underutilized 
Confirmation Requirement, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 199, 211 (2003) (noting the special 
emphasis Chapter 11 places on consensual plan reorganization). 
 16. See generally Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 
Reorganizations, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 432-33 (2005) (explaining that valuation is 
used as a negotiating tool due to the strong incentives for the parties to reach an 
agreement on valuation). 
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clients are in or out of the value band under the pending proposed 
plan.  However, if the plan proponent is able to find a creative way to 
shift value to the dissenting party, that party’s professionals will also 
shift from arguing for a narrow interpretation of a particular statutory 
provision to arguing that it should be broadly construed to permit 
the transferred value to be paid to its client. 
Creative professionals who convince courts to accept expansive 
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code can change the battlefield.  
This phenomenon may make consensus and an emergence from 
Chapter 11 more attainable.  Conversely, it is argued that the 
seemingly straightforward policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code 
(equality of similarly situated parties, adherence to priorities under 
state law:  secured creditors before senior creditors before junior 
creditors before equity) are often barely identifiable in the ashes of 
the give-and-take eggshell deal that is being proposed. 
A.  Requirements for Confirmation of a Consensual Plan 
The Bankruptcy Code’s requirements for confirmation of a plan 
are simple—at least on their face.  Initially, the plan proponent must 
classify all creditor claims and equity interests into separate classes for 
purposes of voting and treatment.  There are two rules for 
classification.  First, to be in the same class, a claim or interest must 
be “substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such 
class.”17  Second, claims or interests can be placed into separate 
classes only if there is a “legitimate business reason” for the separate 
classification18 and not for the purpose of creating an accepting class 
of impaired creditors (a “gerrymander”).19 
Plan classification can be a game, and gerrymandering to achieve 
certain results is a tool of the game, as the proponent’s goal is either 
                                                          
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2000). 
 18. Boston Post Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Boston Post Rd. 
Ltd. P’ship), 21 F.3d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 19. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 
154, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 139 
(5th Cir. 1992)) (“The one clear rule [that] emerges from otherwise muddled 
caselaw on § 1122 claims classification” is that “thou shalt not classify similar claims 
differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan”); 
see also G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Unresolved 
Doctrines of Classification and Unfair Discrimination in Business Reorganizations Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 55 BUS. LAW. 1, 24-32 (1999) (discussing how classification rules first 
appeared in the Bankruptcy Act, how they were interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
and how they evolved through the legislative process into § 1122); Linda J. Rusch, 
Gerrymandering The Classification Issue in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 163, 189-92 (1992) (explaining that, prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, claims of unsecured creditors could be divided into separate classes even if 
such claims were “substantially similar”). 
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to obtain votes to accept the plan from all impaired classes (a 
“consensual” plan) or from at least one impaired accepting class (for 
a “cramdown” plan).  Creative restructuring professionals have 
sought to expansively construe “substantially similar” or what is a 
“legitimate reason” to achieve separate classification.20 
                                                          
 20. Most schemes for winning this classification game involve segregating 
consenting and dissenting creditors to create an impaired class that would vote in 
favor of the plan.  In In re Boston Post Road, the debtor attempted two classification 
maneuvers in an effort to cramdown its plan on its largest creditor.  21 F.3d at 480.  
In that case the largest unsecured claim, by far, was the deficiency claim of the 
secured creditor, which was opposed to the debtor’s proposed plan of 
reorganization.  Id. at 479.  The first maneuver attempted by the debtor was to 
classify the deficiency claim separately from the debtor’s other unsecured creditors.  
Id. at 480.  Creating two classes of unsecured creditors was done because the 
deficiency claim was substantially larger than the claims of the other unsecured 
creditors and if they were put into the same class it would have been “impossible for 
the [d]ebtor to obtain the affirmative vote of two-thirds in amount of such class as 
required by Section 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.”  Id.  However, the court ruled 
that the classification was impermissible, as it constituted improper gerrymandering 
for the purpose of disenfranchising the overwhelmingly largest creditor.  Id. at 483.  
The second scheme tried by the debtor involved classifying a class of creditors as 
impaired even though they were going to receive better treatment under the plan 
than that to which they were entitled for their claims.  Id. at 480.  The debtor sought 
to have this class of creditors count as the single class of impaired consenting 
creditors required under the Bankruptcy Code.  Ultimately, because this class of 
creditors was found to not be entitled to vote for plan confirmation (because their 
leases had not been assumed or rejected), the court did not need to decide whether 
or not a class that was not worse off could be classified as “impaired.”  Id. at 484.  
Impairment is discussed infra at note 25. 
The debtor in John Hancock tried a similar classification tactic by creating a 
separate class for the unsecured deficiency claim of its undersecured creditors.  See 
987 F.2d at 156.  Like in Boston Post Road, the court in John Hancock invalidated the 
classification stating that: 
[I]t seems clear that the Code was not meant to allow a debtor complete 
freedom to place substantially similar claims in separate classes.  The critical 
confirmation requirements set out in [the Code] would be seriously 
undermined if a debtor could gerrymander classes.  A debtor could then 
construct a classification scheme designed to secure approval by an 
arbitrarily designed class of impaired claims even though the overwhelming 
sentiment of the impaired creditors was that the proposed reorganization of 
the debtor would not serve any legitimate purpose.  This would lead to abuse 
of creditors and would foster reorganizations that do not serve any broader 
public interest. 
Id. at 158.  However, the court recognized that, at times, it was clearly reasonable to 
separate similarly situated creditors into different classes.  Id.  For example, the court 
recalled that it had endorsed the separate classification of medical malpractice 
victims, employee benefit plan participants, and trade creditors in the reorganization 
of a medical center.  Id. at 159 (citing In re Jersey City Med. Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1061 
(3d Cir. 1987)).  Therefore, the classification game is about making the 
gerrymandering look reasonable enough that it could be approved by the court.  For 
a court, like the one in John Hancock, that would mean that “each class must 
represent a voting interest that is sufficiently distinct and weighty to merit a separate 
voice in the decision whether the proposed reorganization should proceed.”  Id.  The 
debtor in that case was unable to persuade the court that either of its proffered 
justifications for separate classification (that the deficiency claim entitled the secured 
creditors to unique rights and that combining the unsecured creditors together 
would give too much power to the deficiency claim) were sufficient reasons to 
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Once the claims and interests are classified, the plan proponent 
solicits the acceptance of votes from all “impaired” classes entitled to 
vote on the plan through the dissemination of a court approved 
“disclosure statement” and ballots to all holders of claims and 
interests in such classes.21  A class is unimpaired if the plan (i) “leaves 
unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such 
claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest”22 or 
(ii) cures any defaults, reinstates the maturity of the pre-petition 
claim or interest, compensates the holder for any damages, and does 
not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which 
such claim or interest entitles the holder.23  Impairment (or “artificial 
impairment”) is another area in the playground of creative 
restructuring professionals because only impaired classes are entitled 
to vote on the plan24 and, more importantly, to confirm a plan, at 
least one impaired class of claims must vote to accept the plan 
(without including acceptances by an insider).25 
                                                          
approve the classification.  Id. at 161. 
Other courts have been more receptive to creative classification, even when the 
result is plan confirmation over an objecting creditor.  See, e.g., WHBA Real Est. Ltd. 
P’ship v. Lafayette Hotel P’ship (In re Lafayette Hotel P’ship), 227 B.R. 445, 449 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that “reasonable grounds existed for placing API’s 
unsecured claim into its own class given API’s significant non-creditor interests 
relating to the Debtor’s reorganization and API’s continuous funding obligations 
under the Plan”). 
 21. A disclosure statement is the bankruptcy equivalent of an SEC registration 
statement.  It is impermissible to solicit acceptances or rejections of a plan without a 
disclosure statement approved by the court as containing “adequate information.”  
11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2000).  Adequate information is defined as “information of a 
kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature 
and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records, that 
would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or 
interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan . . . .”  11 
U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1). 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). 
 24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f). 
[A] class that is not impaired under a plan, and each holder of a claim or 
interest of such class, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan, 
and solicitation of acceptances with respect to such class from the holders of 
claims or interests of such class is not required. 
11 U.S.C. § 1126(f); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (stating that the court can 
confirm a plan only “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one 
class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined 
without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider”). 
 25. Because impairment is such a strict test, any alteration in a creditor’s 
treatment, even a token alteration or an improvement, is considered an impairment.  
See L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 995 
F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting Congressional intent to define impairment in 
“the broadest possible terms”).  As such, creative debtors and their attorneys have 
discovered that they can create a consenting impaired class by isolating otherwise 
consenting but unimpaired creditors into a separate class, then adjusting those 
creditors’ recovery, making them impaired ever-so-slightly and thus eligible to vote.  
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After the plan proponent solicits votes, it must demonstrate that it 
has satisfied the thirteen requirements of section 1129(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.26  Among those provisions are the voting 
requirements.  First, as noted, section 1129(a)(10) provides that at 
least one class of impaired claims must have voted to accept the plan 
(without including the votes of insiders).  Second, section 1129(a)(8) 
provides that every class must either (i) be unimpaired or (ii) have 
accepted the plan.  A class of claims has accepted the plan if creditors 
holding at least (i) two-thirds in amount and (ii) one-half in number 
of the allowed claims in the class who have voted on the plan have 
voted to accept the plan.27 
                                                          
Although nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits such behavior, courts have 
found it inequitable and have deemed such “artificial impairment” impermissible; 
however, courts have been divided on how much alteration in recovery should be 
considered actual impairment.  See Daniel J. Carragher, News at 11:  Artificial 
Impairment Revisited, 24-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Feb. 2005) (commenting on the 
artificial impairment debate within the context of the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re 
Combustion Eng’g Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
Thus, some courts have allowed mere token alterations to satisfy section 
1129(a)(10) regardless of the debtor’s motivation or the artificial nature of the 
impairment.  See In re Duval Manor Assocs., 191 B.R. 622, 626-29 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1996) (allowing for impairment of the barest imaginable degree to satisfy section 
1129(a)(10), including a slight delay in payment of half of the recovery amount); In 
re Witt, 60 B.R. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (considering payment of $1,600.00 
under the plan as opposed to $1,675.00 owed as appropriate impairment); Conn. 
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotel Assocs. of Tucson (In re Hotel Assocs. of Tucson), 165 B.R. 
470, 474-75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (finding a thirty-day delay in payment proper 
impairment for § 1129(a)(10) but allowing for the motivation behind such token 
impairment to be considered in looking at the good faith requirement). 
In contrast, other courts have taken a hard line against “artificial impairment” by 
not allowing it for purposes of obtaining an impaired consenting class under 
§ 1129(a)(10).  These courts have attempted to draw the line between impermissible 
and permissible impairment.  For example, one court held that “[a] class is 
artificially impaired if a debtor intentionally alters the class members’ rights in order 
to manipulate the voting process, but it is legitimately impaired if the creditors’ 
rights are altered for a proper business purpose.”  Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge 
Ltd. P’ship, 248 B.R. 668, 691 (D. Mass. 2000); see Windsor on the River Assocs. Ltd. 
v. Balcor Real Est. Fin. Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs. Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 131 
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that clear artificial impairment evidenced by the availability 
of an alternative plan that would leave only the dissenting class impaired was not 
permissible because, “[t]o allow manipulation of claims in a reorganization 
proceeding under Chapter 11 would be contrary to the purpose of the provisions of 
the bankruptcy code.”); In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 39 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1989) (finding that, where the debtor’s plan delayed payment to a consenting 
creditor by two weeks, “[w]hile the debtor may have achieved literal compliance with 
§ 1129(a)(10), this engineered impairment so distorts the meaning and purpose of 
that subsection that to permit it would reduce (a)(10) to a nullity”). 
 26. The plan proponent carries the burden of satisfying each requirement by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Heartland Fed. Sav. Ass’n Enters. v. Briscoe Enters. 
Ltd. II (In re Briscoe Enters. Ltd. II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 27. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).  A class of interest has accepted the plan if interest 
holders holding at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests in the class who 
have voted on the plan have voted to accept the plan.  11 U.S.C. § 1126(d). 
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B.  Requirements for Cramdown:  Unfair Discrimination Prohibition and 
Absolute Priority Rule 
While section 1129(a) sets forth the requirements of a consensual 
plan (i.e., one in which all impaired classes accept the plan), section 
1129(b) permits the plan to be confirmed if requested by the plan 
proponent, via “cramdown” if all the requirements of section 1129(a) 
other than section 1129(a)(8) (acceptances by all impaired classes) 
have been satisfied.  Specifically, section 1129(b)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides that, if all requirements of section 1129(a) 
other than section 1129(a)(8) are met and the plan proponent has 
requested application of section 1129(b), the court shall confirm the 
plan if it meets two requirements as to each impaired class of claims 
or interests that has not accepted the plan.  First, it cannot 
“discriminate unfairly.”  Second, it must be “fair and equitable.”  
These two “cramdown” prerequisites are the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition and the Absolute Priority Rule, respectively. 
Because the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition and the Absolute 
Priority Rule are set forth in section 1129(b), they only apply when 
confirmation of a non-consensual plan is requested.  Therefore, a 
plan that discriminates unfairly or does not comply with the Absolute 
Priority Rule is confirmable if the classes that are discriminated 
against vote to accept the plan or the classes of higher priority who 
are not paid in full vote to accept the plan despite a return being 
provided to junior classes.28  As an initial matter, because it is the 
exception that equity is unimpaired (and indeed, equity usually does 
not participate in the reorganization value, it is generally deemed to 
have rejected the plan),29 a plan proponent will always have to use 
cramdown as to classes of equity interests.  However, as described 
below, compliance with absolute priority and lack of unfair 
discrimination is relatively easy to establish when equity is the only 
impaired rejecting class.  Cramming down a class of creditors, 
particularly an unsecured class of creditors, is the more interesting 
scenario. 
                                                          
 28. See In re Drimmel, 135 B.R. 410, 414 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating “the absolute 
priority rule need not be satisfied if there is unanimous consent of the creditor 
classes . . .”); Herbert Constr. Co., Inc. v. Greater N.Y. Sav. Bank (In re 455 CPW 
Assocs.), 1999 WL 675972, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (overruling objection based on 
Absolute Priority Rule because plan had consent of all creditor classes). 
 29. Section 1126(g) provides that “a class is deemed not to have accepted a plan 
if such plan provides that the claims or interests of such class do not entitle the 
holders of such claims or interests to receive or retain any property under the plan 
on account of such claims or interests.” 
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The Bankruptcy Code does not provide any guidance on the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, and as discussed in Part III below, 
the case law has not set forth a uniform standard for determining 
when the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition has been violated.  Its 
purpose, however, is fairly clear in light of the classification rules.  
Because the Bankruptcy Code grants debtors some flexibility in how 
it allocates its creditors into classes,30 this flexibility presents debtors 
with the opportunity to “stack the deck” for voting purposes.  The 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was developed to ensure that 
(non-consenting) creditors were not being unfairly classified, isolated 
from similarly situated creditors, and treated poorly relative to those 
similar creditors (or favored creditors were not being similarly 
isolated for the purposes of some sort of unjustified bonus recovery). 
In contrast to the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, the 
Bankruptcy Code explicitly sets forth the requirements for the 
Absolute Priority Rule.  There are three variants on the Absolute 
Priority Rule depending on whether the objecting class, which is 
being crammed down under the plan, consists of secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors, or equity holders.  This Article focuses on the 
Absolute Priority Rule as applied to an objecting class of unsecured 
creditors.  However, it is worth noting that to cramdown a class of 
secured creditors, the plan must provide for one of three scenarios 
set forth in section 1129(b)(2)(A): 
(i)(I) that [the secured creditors in the class (I)] retain the liens 
securing such claims . . . to the extent of the allowed amount of 
such claim; and (II) that each holder of a claim of such class 
receive . . . deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed 
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the 
plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s 
interest in such property;31 
                                                          
 30. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1122.  For example, debtors can also allow creditors 
of identical priority to be assigned to different classes even if those classes will receive 
different treatment under the plan.  Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 32-37.  
Brunstad and Sigal observe that the case law is split on exactly how flexible the 
classification rules are.  Generally they found that judges restrict separate 
classification of creditors with parity by either the “nature of the claim,” “nature of 
the claimant,” “business justification,” “general fairness,” “reasonableness,” or they 
do not enforce any substantial restrictions.  Id. 
 31. This provision requires that a crammed-down secured lien holder retain its 
lien on the attached collateral up to the amount of the allowed secured claim (the 
portion of the secured claim that is not allowed is considered unsecured because it is 
not covered by the value of the collateral) and also receive present value of the 
allowed claim through deferred cash payments.  See generally Joel L. Tabas, The 
§ 1111(b) Election:  A Decision-making Framework, 23-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 (2004) 
(providing an analytical framework for determining whether making an election 
under § 1111(b) would be in the unsecured creditor’s best interest); David G. 
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(ii) for the sale . . . of any property that is subject to the liens 
securing the [secured creditors’] claims, free and clear of such 
liens, with the liens attaching to the proceeds of the sale, and the 
treatment of the liens on the proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of 
this subparagraph;32 or 
(iii) for the realization by [the secured creditors] of the 
indubitable equivalent of such claims.33 
To cramdown a class of unsecured creditors, section 
1129(b)(2)(B) requires that the plan must either (i) pay those 
creditors in full (technically provide that all creditors in the class 
receive “property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal 
to the allowed amount of such claim”) or, as is more common, 
(ii) “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of 
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of 
such junior claim or interest any property [from the debtor’s 
estate].”34 
                                                          
Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 
435, 439-43 (1998) (discussing cramdown provisions of secured claims). 
 32. This provision is enforced if the collateral that is securing the allowed claim 
of the secured creditor is sold under a plan.  To protect the secured creditor, the 
code requires that the secured creditor’s lien carries over to the proceeds of the sale 
of the collateral and that this new lien remains protected by one of the other 
provisions of § 1129(b)(2)(A).  See Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States ex rel. 
United States Farmers Home Admin. (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415, 
1420 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 33. Here a court can force a secured creditor to exchange its lien for its 
indubitable equivalent.  The hallmark of indubitable equivalency is not clearly 
defined and courts have been allowed to determine as a matter of fact what exactly it 
means.  In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 172 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 34. “The [Absolute Priority Rule] has three components:  (1) the identification 
of junior claims or interests; (2) the identification of any property retained by the 
holders of such claims or interests; and (3) the determination whether the property 
is retained ‘on account of’ a junior claim or interest.”  In re 4 C Solutions, Inc., 302 
B.R. 592, 596 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (citing In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 72 
F.3d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995)).  Thus, a plan that proposed to provide the owners 
of a farm in Chapter 11 with a continuing interest despite that an objecting class of 
unsecured creditors was not paid in full violated the Absolute Priority Rule.  Norwest 
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1988); see In re Drimmel, 135 B.R. 
410, 412 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that the Absolute Priority Rule gives “unsecured 
creditors [] an absolute priority over equity interests to receive money or property 
until the unsecured creditors are paid in full”).  In 4 C Solutions, the court held that 
distribution of equity in the reorganized debtor under a plan of reorganization to 
the majority shareholder of the debtor’s parent, where an impaired class of claims 
rejected the plan, violated the Absolute Priority Rule.  302 B.R. at 600.  “The 
common thread running through cases involving the Absolute Priority Rule is a 
refusal to allow prior equity owners to trade on their ‘insider’ status to acquire new 
equity for less than its value.”  Id. at 596 (citing In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 
72 F.3d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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C.  Creative Strategies for Avoiding The Unfair Discrimination Prohibition 
and Absolute Priority Rule 
As applied to an objecting class of unsecured creditors, the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition and the Absolute Priority Rule appear 
fairly straightforward.  The plan cannot provide the objecting class of 
creditors a distribution that is substantially different from other co-
equal classes (horizontal parity) and the plan cannot provide any 
junior class of claims or interests below the objecting class (generally, 
equity holders) any distribution (vertical justice).  Notwithstanding 
these seemingly straightforward requirements, innovative structures 
have been created to soften the hard edges of the Absolute Priority 
Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition to enable the 
reorganization of the debtor. 
1.  The New Value Corollary 
A plan will occasionally provide a distribution to some or all equity 
holders (despite the existence of an objecting class of creditors) on 
the grounds that the distribution is not being given to the 
shareholder “on account of” the equity interest, but was given for 
“new value” being contributed by the equity holder.  The New Value 
Corollary is also known as the “new value exception.”  When a 
shareholder obtains an interest in the reorganized entity as a result of 
infusing new value, the interest is not truly “on account of” the old 
shares.35  Rather, it is “on account of” the new value.  As such, the 
situation is not really an exception to the Absolute Priority Rule.  The 
new investment falls outside of the scope of the Absolute Priority 
Rule. 
The “New Value Corollary” was addressed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Bank of America National Trust and Savings 
Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.36  In that case, despite 
the arguments presented, the Supreme Court side-stepped the issue 
of whether the New Value Corollary survived the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Supreme Court did say that if the New Value 
Corollary exists, the opportunity to receive a distribution on account 
of new value must be subject to a market test (i.e., offered to others 
                                                          
 35. What is prohibited by the Absolute Priority Rule is the receipt or retention 
under the plan of any property by a junior stakeholder on account of its claim or 
interest. 
 36. 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
MILLER 6/28/2006  9:15:42 PM 
2006]  STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE 1359 
and not made exclusive to old shareholders).37  The New Value 
Corollary is discussed in more detail below.38 
2.  The Gifting Strategy (Armstrong) 
Another structure designed to achieve plan confirmation, and the 
topic of this Article, has been to argue that the additional 
consideration being distributed under the plan to one class of 
unsecured creditors over another (in seeming violation of the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition) or the consideration being received by 
equity when an objecting class of creditors is not being paid in full (in 
seeming violation of the Absolute Priority Rule) is not property of the 
debtor’s estate and is instead being provided or “gifted” or 
“contributed” consensually by other creditors.  Under the most 
attenuated scenario, the distribution is deemed to be given by the 
debtor to an accepting class of creditors and, by accepting the plan, 
that class is deemed to waive that particular distribution in favor of 
the junior class.  Under this argument, the Absolute Priority Rule 
does not apply to the distribution, because it is being given by non-
debtors who have a “right” to do whatever they want with their plan 
distribution, i.e., their property. 
This is exactly what the debtor and its professionals attempted to 
do in Armstrong.39  As described below, under the plan negotiated 
among many disparate groups’ representatives, including the debtor, 
the general unsecured creditors’ committee, the asbestos personal 
injury claimants’ committee, and others, it was agreed that an equity 
holder would receive a distribution of warrants in the reorganized 
debtor.40  However, to effectuate the agreement reached if the 
general unsecured creditors rejected the plan, the plan provided that 
in such case, the warrants would not be issued by the debtor to 
equity.41  Instead, the warrants would be technically distributed by the 
debtor to the class of asbestos personal injury claimants,42 which the 
debtor knew would accept the plan.  The plan further provided that 
by accepting the plan, the class of asbestos personal injury claimants 
would be deemed to have agreed to waive receipt of the warrants and 
contribute them to the equity holder.43  Although the end result was 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 457. 
 38. See infra Part II.A.9. 
 39. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 40. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 525-26 (D. 
Del. 2005). 
 41. 432 F.3d at 509. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 320 B.R. at 526 & n.8. 
MILLER 6/28/2006  9:15:42 PM 
1360 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1345 
the same as if the debtor had provided the warrants directly to the 
equity holder, because the plan structure provided for the 
distribution of the warrants to a class of creditors equal in priority to 
the objecting general unsecured creditors, with that class 
contributing the warrants to the equity holder, the debtor believed 
that the Absolute Priority Rule did not apply. 
While the plan in Armstrong might appear extreme to an observer 
inexperienced with the evolution of the Bankruptcy Code since 1978, 
the Armstrong plan was merely the next step in a series of singularly 
minor but cumulatively major steps since the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals issued its influential decision in Official, Unsecured Creditors’ 
Committee v. Stern (In re SPM Manufacturing Corp.).44  SPM did not 
involve the Absolute Priority Rule.  In SPM, the secured creditor in a 
Chapter 7 case agreed to give a portion of the proceeds received 
from the liquidation of its collateral security to general unsecured 
creditors in exchange for such creditors’ agreement to an orderly 
non-litigious liquidation of the debtor’s estate.45  The First Circuit 
condoned this agreement, over the objection of a taxing authority, 
which would have had Bankruptcy Code priority over the general 
unsecured creditors as to any distribution of proceeds from the 
debtor’s unencumbered property.46  In oft-quoted language, the 
court noted “creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish 
with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including to share them 
with other creditors.”47 
Subsequently, many courts relied on this quote from SPM to hold 
that various gifting arrangements were appropriate notwithstanding 
the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition or the Absolute Priority Rule.48  
With a few exceptions, courts have generally accepted the extensions 
of SPM—from the Chapter 7 context (where the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition and the Absolute Priority Rule do not 
apply) to Chapter 11 plans (where they do apply), from gifting by 
secured creditors (whose interest in the collateral is undisputed) to 
gifting through other unsecured creditors (who receive the 
distribution only because the debtors agreed to provide it to them), 
and so on.  Courts have generally only refused to apply SPM upon 
finding inappropriate attempts to circumvent protective provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Nevertheless, the debtor in Armstrong went just 
                                                          
 44. 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 45. Id. at 1308. 
 46. Id. at 1313. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See infra Part III. 
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a step further in proposing a plan providing for alternate distribution 
schemes for the warrants to get to the equity holder via the “gifting” 
mechanism only if the class of general unsecured creditors rejected 
the plan. 
Faced with what it believed was brazen flouting of the Absolute 
Priority Rule (to get to an impermissible end), the District Court for 
the District of Delaware, in Armstrong I, rejected the 
recommendations of the Bankruptcy Court and denied confirmation 
of the plan.49  The Third Circuit concurred.50  According to the 
district court, the concept of gifting had gone too far.  That court 
held that while SPM may have been appropriate in its limited factual 
circumstances, the extensions of SPM leading up to Armstrong 
generally were not.51  In the court’s view, both the language and 
legislative history of the Absolute Priority Rule were clear that equity 
was to get no distribution on account of its equity interests—period.52  
In a fairly short opinion, the Third Circuit adopted the reasoning of 
the district court;53 clever plan drafting and skillful creative 
negotiation by the bankruptcy professionals be damned.  From the 
district court’s perspective the plain meaning of the code provisions 
could not be disregarded on the basis that reorganization is the 
primary objective of Chapter 11. 
The Armstrong decision marks a triumph of form over substance 
and may chill creative solutions to complex multi-party negotiations.  
The result of this decision is that Chapter 11 plan negotiations may 
be more difficult, leading to longer periods spent in Chapter 11 by 
debtors (contrary to the goals of Chapter 11) and more contentious 
confirmation battles.54 
                                                          
 49. See Armstrong I, 320 B.R. at 540 (“Bluntly put, no amount of legal creativity or 
counsel’s incantation to general notions of equity or to any supposed policy favoring 
reorganizations over liquidation supports judicial rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Accordingly, the New Warrants distribution to the Equity Interest Holders under the 
Fourth Amended Reorganization Plan violates 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).  The 
Plan, therefore, cannot be confirmed.”). 
 50. See Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514 (rejecting the idea that there are no limits on 
what creditors may do with the bankruptcy proceeds they receive). 
 51. Armstrong I, 320 B.R. at 539-40. 
 52. Id. at 536. 
 53. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514. 
 54. Even the Third Circuit recognized that, although it was affirming the 
decision to deny plan confirmation, “the longer that the reorganization process 
takes, the less likely that the purposes of Chapter 11 (preserving the business as a 
going concern and maximizing the amount that can be paid to creditors) will be 
fulfilled.”  Id. at 518.  While this statement is not always true (i.e., sometimes quick 
fixes minimize value), it is generally true.  Moreover, it is always a shame for a 
company to linger in Chapter 11 incurring professionals fees and unable to move on 
simply due to a technicality that one group is relying on for hold up value. 
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II.  HISTORY OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE AND UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITION 
To evaluate the merits of Armstrong, one must examine the roots 
and policy behind the Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition. 
A.  The Absolute Priority Rule 
1.  Equity receiverships 
The history of the Absolute Priority Rule takes us back to the 
nineteenth century when the economic distress of the railroads was 
pervasive.55  As the railroad industry grew, from the Civil War through 
World War II, railroads were organized with highly leveraged, 
unworkable capital structures.56  As a result of an inability to generate 
sufficient operating revenue to service its debt, due in part to 
cutthroat competition, the railroad industry in the United States 
began to suffer widespread decline and insolvency.57  By 1915, almost 
half of all railroads had defaulted on their debt obligations at one 
time or another and required some sort of financial restructuring.58 
In light of the size and importance of railroads and the interstate 
dimension of their operations, federal courts responded to the crisis 
by creating a form of reorganization known as the equity 
receivership.59  The judicially created equity receivership is analogous 
to modern-day Chapter 11.60  The equity receivership was a friendly, 
                                                          
 55. See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 
969-70 (1989) (recapitulating the early history of the absolute priority rule). 
 56. See Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1433-35 (2004) (noting that the decline of the railroad 
industry was made worse by three trends:  decline in availability of foreign 
investment, an increased reliance on debt financing, and an increased use of internal 
funding); Ayer, supra note 55, at 970. 
 57. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1428-29 (attributing the decline in railroads to 
low net revenues that resulted from cutthroat competition in the form of extreme 
rate cuts and “continued financial rot,” by which the author appears to imply corrupt 
management); Ayer, supra note 55, at 970. 
 58. See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74 (1991)  (explaining that the ineffectiveness of 
foreclosure as a remedy for defaulted loans gave rise to the alternate remedy of 
reorganization). 
 59. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1441; DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION, 56-
57 (Peter Dougherty ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (2001) (explaining that courts 
created the equity receivership by combining two common-law principles:  the 
court’s power to appoint receivers to preserve the value of a debtor’s property and 
the mortgage holder’s right to foreclose on property when the debtor defaults); see 
also Markell, supra note 58, at 74-75 (asserting that the receivership also emerged out 
of necessity—it was necessary to reorganize the business as a going concern because 
no one could afford to buy the railroad assets in a typical disclosure proceeding). 
 60. See SKEEL, supra note 59, at 58 (noting that appointing a receiver served 
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cooperative process commenced by a creditor filing a petition (a 
“creditor’s bill”) in federal court asking the court to exercise its 
equity jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to administer the insolvent 
debtor’s assets.61  The company, which was required to file an answer, 
generally admitted to the allegations in the petition and consented to 
the appointment of the receiver.62  The court would then grant the 
petition and appoint a receiver.63 
Consistent with the appointment of the receiver, the federal court 
would issue an injunction staying actions against the railroad and its 
property.64  The receiver would operate and manage the railroad 
until the various stakeholders, who usually formed themselves into 
protective committees, negotiated a plan of reorganization with the 
assistance of a reorganization manager.65  The plan would provide for 
the sale of the railroad property with an upset price to a new 
company that would continue to operate the railroad.66  Usually the 
secured creditors would end up owning the new railroad company 
and some proceeds of the sale would be distributed under the plan.67 
Often, the former owners of the railroad would retain an equity 
interest in the reorganized company despite the failure to satisfy 
creditors in whole.68  This happened for several reasons.  Sometimes, 
the secured creditors agreed to buy off the equity to avoid frivolous 
                                                          
largely the same purpose as an automatic stay issued in a Chapter 11 proceeding, in 
that most creditors had to cease their collection attempts).  But see Lubben, supra 
note 56, at 1424-25 (stating that the equity receiverships were more like workouts 
than Chapter 11, as they were limited to modest adjustments to the company’s 
capital structure). 
 61. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1441-42 (clarifying 
that the petition had to be filed by an unsecured creditor to ensure that the receiver 
obtained control over all of the debtor’s assets, not just those subject to the secured 
creditor’s liens).  State court receiverships did exist and were common, but large 
creditors preferred federal jurisdiction, which they would obtain through diversity 
jurisdiction.  See id. at 1442. 
 62. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1442. 
 63. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1442 (noting that courts sometimes appointed 
multiple receivers).  Thus, although the court often appointed an officer or other 
insider of the company to be the receiver, it would generally also appoint an 
independent co-receiver to guard against self-dealing.  See id. 
 64. See SKEEL, supra note 59, at 58 (remarking that freezing most of the railroad’s 
debt obligations gave the parties “breathing space” to design a reorganization plan). 
 65. See id. (noting that the committees could take months, or even years, to 
negotiate a reorganization plan). 
 66. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1444 (pointing out that in most of these sales, 
the new company was comprised of the reorganization committee). 
 67. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445; Markell, supra 
note 58, at 75-76. 
 68. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445 (describing how the former shareholders 
would pay a cash assessment that provided much needed liquidity to the reorganized 
railroad in exchange for stock in the new entity). 
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and time-consuming objections to their scheme.69  Other times, either 
the old equity holders were the best source of cash that was needed 
for the reorganization, or the secured creditors believed the old 
owners were necessary to manage the reorganized enterprise.70  In yet 
other cases, the debtor was controlled by management insiders who 
owned both bonds and stock.71 
All of these situations involved collusion between the debtor and 
the secured creditors.  At first, the secured creditor would initiate the 
judicial proceeding, and the debtor would consent to the 
appointment of a receiver.72  Later the fiction of a controverted 
proceeding was dispensed with and the debtor commenced with 
equity receivership by direct petition.73  Generally, the appointed 
receiver would sell the railroad company assets to a “new” entity for 
less than the amount needed to cover the secured debt, and 
sometimes less than the actual value of the assets.74  Importantly, the 
investors in the new entity were generally the stockholders and 
secured bondholders of the old company.75  The secured 
bondholders could “credit bid” the face amount of their securities.76  
For a contribution (or “assessment”) in the new entity, the old equity 
would end up retaining an interest in the assets worth much more 
than the size of the contribution.77 
                                                          
 69. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 971. 
 70. See Markell, supra note 58, at 75-76 (explaining that because the old equity 
holders were often also managers of the railroad, they had knowledge of how to run 
the entity and they were also willing to invest new cash to save their former 
investment). 
 71. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 971 (noting that it did not matter to these insider-
managers if they lost on bonds, but gained on stock).  Lubben describes the railroad 
industry of the era as extremely corrupt.  “Most of the great [railroads] had been 
built by fraudulent construction companies, and if perchance a [rail]road had been 
honestly built, there was always an opportunity to correct this oversight by 
disreputable, but highly profitable, manipulation of its securities.”  Lubben, supra 
note 56, at 1427 (quoting E. G. CAMPBELL, THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN 
RAILROAD SYSTEM 1893-1900 15 (1938)).  He cites several examples, including the use 
of management-owned companies to do the construction and accounting fraud.  Id. 
 72. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970. 
 73. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1441 n.106 (citing Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. Cent. Trust Co., 22 F. 272, 272-75 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884) as the first case in 
which the debtor initiated its own receivership). 
 74. Ayer, supra note 55, at 970. 
 75. Id.; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445. 
 76. See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 683 
(1899) (acknowledging the general rule that secured creditors were the most likely 
purchasers in a foreclosure sale because of the high cost of railroads); see also 
Lubben, supra note 56, at 1444-45 (recognizing that collusion among bankers may 
have also prevented outside purchasers from obtaining financing to purchase the 
assets). 
 77. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970-71 (explaining that while the insider 
bondholders lose on their secured bond claims by permitting equity to participate, 
they would benefit on their equity interests, all at the expense of non-insider 
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The old secured creditors would receive securities in the new 
company.78  Sometimes only a subset of the old secured creditors 
would participate in the reorganized entity, with the other 
bondholders getting paid in cash from the sale of the assets.79  As 
explained below, until the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was 
developed, it was possible to treat some secured creditors differently 
from others, and Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was developed to 
prevent such outcomes.80 
Most of the time, however, all secured creditors had an incentive to 
participate in the sale or otherwise receive a lesser recovery.81  
Specifically, the court would set an “upset price,” which was the 
minimum price for which the railroad’s assets could be sold.82  
Claimants were provided an opportunity to either participate in the 
sale or receive a cash distribution at the upset price.83  The upset 
price was set intentionally low to encourage creditors to agree to the 
plan.84  Thus, old secured creditors would accept the distribution that 
provided potentially less than their full secured debt, but with an 
opportunity to realize higher returns from future operations.  The 
alternative of non-acceptance was a low cash payout.85  Because the 
assets were sold for less than the secured debt, unsecured creditors 
were squeezed out and generally received nothing.86 
                                                          
bondholders and trade creditors); Markell, supra note 58, at 76 (describing how the 
foreclosure sale made the railroad’s assets unreachable by unsecured creditors).  
Lubben states that the assessment paid by stockholders, though smaller than the 
value of the stock, was actually high enough to exclude smaller stakeholders, such as 
unsecured creditors and minority stockholders, who could not afford the assessment.  
See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1446. 
 78. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445 (noting that existing shareholders would 
receive preferred stock in the new corporation or subordinated notes in exchange 
for paying an assessment). 
 79. See Markell, supra note 7, at 230 (explaining that the minority groups of 
secured creditors often opted for cash proceeds from the sale rather than 
participation in the new entity). 
 80. See infra notes 207-44. 
 81. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970 (emphasizing that the price of the new entity 
was consistently less than the entity’s actual worth); Lubben, supra note 56, at 1450 
(likening the upset price to an auction reserve). 
 82. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1450 (noting that the court set the upset price, 
in part to prevent parties from conspiring to pay a price that would defeat the just 
claims of other secured creditors). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. (suggesting that the upset price began as a tool to protect minority 
creditors, but evolved into a tool to force reluctant creditors to agree to the plan). 
 85. See id. (remarking that most bondholders realized that the securities were 
worth more than the cash proceeds from the sale). 
 86. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970 (concluding that unsecured creditors were 
“eliminated” from the transaction); Markell, supra note 58, at 76 (explaining that the 
mortgagor had first priority over the old railroad entity’s assets, leaving nothing for 
remaining creditors).  Although without statutory authority, there was no formal 
discharge of the unsecured debt, the effect was the same as a discharge, as the 
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In general, the equity receiverships were not wholly successful.87  
Just as the secured creditors were often compelled to provide the old 
owners with more than they were arguably entitled to, the 
negotiation usually resulted in the reorganized company taking on a 
debt burden larger than it could handle.88  Consequently, many 
railroad companies that ended up in equity receiverships availed 
themselves of the process multiple times.89 
2.  Boyd and the development of the “fixed principle” 
While the collusion between the old owners and the secured 
creditors led each side to extract as much value as possible from the 
assets, often at the expense of the health of the company, one 
commonality that existed in the equity receiverships was the 
elimination of any recovery for the unsecured creditors.90  The 
apparent wrongfulness of equity retaining an interest in the 
reorganized railroad while unsecured creditors received nothing lead 
to the establishment of the Absolute Priority Rule, then called the 
“fixed principle.”91 
Although courts adjudicating railroad cases had long recognized 
the concept that an equity holder’s interest in property of a debtor’s 
                                                          
unsecured creditors were left to pursue their claims against a shell company with no 
assets (the former railroad).  See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1444-45. 
 87. Lubben, supra note 56, at 1423. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id.  Lubben found that, 
having undergone a receivership before World War I made a railroad more 
than two-and-a-half times (or 150%) more likely to undergo another 
receivership or bankruptcy after the War.  The average railroad that 
organized under a receivership subsequently failed at a rate more than twice 
as high as railroads that had never gone through a receivership and almost 
three times as high as modern Chapter 11 debtors. 
Id.  According to Lubben, the receivership acted as a safe harbor of sorts for railroads 
during economic downturns.  Id. at 1451.  When a downturn occurred, the railroad 
would consent to the receivership.  Id.  It would remain in operation during the 
downturn and emerge from receivership when the economy improved without the 
needed debt reductions, as those would be opposed by the secured bondholders.  Id. 
at 1451-52. 
 90. See Markell, supra note 58, at 76 (describing how bondholders and 
stockholders would collude to protect their interests during the foreclosure sale and 
the implementation of the reorganization plan, without considering the interests of 
unsecured creditors). 
 91. See In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In 
its origins, the absolute priority rule was a judicial invention designed to preclude the 
practice in railroad reorganizations of ‘squeezing out’ intermediate unsecured 
creditors through collusion between secured creditors and stockholders (who were 
often the same people).”) (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 482 (1913)).  
Markell notes that the first attacks by unsecured creditors on the receiver scheme 
started as fraudulent conveyance arguments, the idea being that shareholders and 
secured creditors were scheming to transfer assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud creditors.  Markell, supra note 58, at 76-77. 
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estate is subordinate to the rights of creditors,92 the United States 
Supreme Court officially embraced that “fixed principle” in Northern 
Pacific Railway v. Boyd, a 5-4 decision.93  In Boyd, representatives of the 
secured creditors (bondholders) and representatives of the 
stockholders agreed to a plan of reorganization, which was approved 
by the equity receivership court.94  In accordance with the plan, the 
parties transferred property of the old railroad company (the 
insolvent Northern Pacific Railroad Company) to a new company (the 
newly created Northern Pacific Railway Company).95  Despite an 
agreement between the secured creditors and stockholders that the 
property being transferred had a value of $345,000,000, the price 
paid for the property was $61,500,000, which was $86,000,000 less 
than the amount of the secured debts on the company.96  The old 
secured bondholders received bonds in the new company and the old 
equity holders received an equity interest in the Northern Pacific 
Railway Company.97  Interestingly, the new railroad company was 
profitable, and the price of the equity securities rose after the 
reorganization.98 
After the sale, a general unsecured creditor of the old company 
commenced an action against the new company seeking payment on 
his claim against the old company.99  He argued that the sale was void 
because it was made in pursuance of an illegal plan of reorganization 
between secured bondholders and stockholders under which 
unsecured creditors were not paid but stockholders received value by 
receiving shares in the new company.100 
The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the creditor, 
allowing him to pursue his claim against the new company in light of 
its ownership by the old equity holders.101  The Court held that the 
equity holders and bondholders should not have been able to 
accomplish in a court proceeding what they could not have 
accomplished in a private sale.102  The Court noted that “a transfer by 
                                                          
 92. See Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684 
(1899) (“[A]ny arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights and 
interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior 
rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.”). 
 93. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
 94. Id. at 489. 
 95. Id. at 501. 
 96. Id. at 489-90. 
 97. Id. at 488. 
 98. Id. at 491. 
 99. Id. at 501. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 501-02. 
 102. Id. at 502. 
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stockholders from themselves to themselves [in a private sale] cannot 
defeat the claim of a non-assenting creditor.  As against him the sale 
is void in equity, regardless of the motive with which it was made.”103  
And, “[t]here is no difference in principle if the contract of 
reorganization, instead of being effectuated by private sale, is 
consummated by a master’s deed under a consent decree.”104  
Further, “[a]ny device, whether by private contract or judicial sale 
under consent decree, whereby stockholders were preferred before 
the creditor was invalid.”105  Accordingly, the new company (in the 
hands of the old stockholders) was subject to the existing liabilities of 
the old company.106  Thus, even though the court found there was no 
fraud and that this was a contractual arrangement between the 
bondholders and the shareholders, the transfer of assets to the new 
Northern Pacific Railway Company with old ownership interests 
becoming the new equity holders subjected the new company to the 
unsecured debts of the old company.107 
Interestingly, the plan proponents made an Armstrong-gifting-type 
argument that was rejected by the Court.108  They argued that because 
the property was sold for less than the value of the mortgage debt, 
there would have been nothing left for unsecured creditors even if 
equity had not received a distribution.109  Although it does not appear 
that it was argued explicitly that the secured creditors contributed or 
gifted their distribution to equity, this could have been implied. 
The Court rejected this argument, noting that such an agreement 
with equity negatively alters the incentives that equity would 
otherwise have had to side with the general unsecured creditors in 
asserting a high value for the property: 
In saying that there was nothing for unsecured creditors the 
argument assumes the very fact which the law contemplated was to 
be tested by adversary proceeding in which it would have been to 
the interest of the stockholders to interpose every valid defense.  If, 
after a trial, a sale was ordered, they were still interested in making 
the property bring its value, so as to leave a surplus for themselves 
as ultimate owners.  Even after sale they could have opposed its 
confirmation if the bids had been chilled, or other reason existed 
to prevent is approval.  In the present case all these tests and 
                                                          
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 504. 
 106. Id. at 507. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 505. 
 109. Id. 
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safeguards were withdrawn.  The stockholders, who, in lawfully 
protecting themselves, would necessarily have protected unsecured 
creditors, abandoned the defense that the foreclosure suit had 
been prematurely brought.  The law, of course, did not require 
them to make or insist upon that defense if it was not meritorious, 
nor does it condemn the decree solely because it was entered by 
consent.  But the shareholders were not merely quiescent.  They, 
though in effect defendants, became parties to a contract with the 
creditors, who were in effect complainants, by which, in 
consideration of stock in the new company, they transferred their 
shares in the railroad to the railway.  The latter then owning the 
bonds of the complainant and controlling the stock in the 
defendant, became the representative of both parties in interest.  
In such a situation there was nothing to litigate, and so the 
demurrer to the bill was withdrawn.110 
For this reason, the Court held the value of the assets did not 
matter—rather it announced a “fixed principle” that equity was never 
to be paid when creditors were not paid in full.111  If equity 
participated when creditors were not paid in full, a presumption of 
collusion arose.112  However, foreshadowing the future Court’s 
interpretation of the “New Value Corollary,” which is discussed below 
in more detail, the Boyd Court suggested that by offering the right to 
participate to all creditors, the plan proponents could defeat the 
presumption of collusion.113 
3.  Innovative structures to avoid Boyd 
Even though, in prior cases, the Court had articulated the general 
concept that equity holders could not be paid if creditors were not 
paid in full, the Boyd decision solidified the Absolute Priority Rule as 
a force in reorganization practice.114  Although the Boyd case sent 
                                                          
 110. Id. at 505-06. 
 111. Id. at 507.  The Court wrote, 
The invalidity of the sale flowed from the character of the reorganization 
agreement regardless of the value of the property, for in cases like this, the 
question must be decided according to a fixed principle, not leaving the 
rights of the creditors to depend upon the balancing of evidence as to 
whether, on the day of the sale, the property was insufficient to pay prior 
encumbrances. 
Id. 
 112. Id.; see Markell, supra note 58, at 81 (noting that the presumption of collusion 
was sufficient to create liability of the new entity). 
 113. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508; see also Markell, supra note 58, at 81 (characterizing this 
method to defeat the presumption of collusion as a procedural tool to avoid judicial 
involvement in evaluating the worth of the entity). 
 114. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 973 (arguing that, although the Absolute Priority 
Rule had been recognized by the Court in other cases, the facts of Boyd, particularly 
that the creditor who brought the suit had very unsympathetic facts, demonstrated 
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“chills of terror down the spines of the corporate reorganization 
bar,”115 clever reorganization professionals developed structures to 
avoid its full effect.116  Among those practices were obtaining court 
approval of the deal to bar later objections.117  Others were able to 
convince courts that obtaining acceptance by a substantial majority of 
senior creditors demonstrated the fairness of the plan and were able 
to engineer the process to prevent dissent.118  Certain scholars 
developed a theory of “relative priority,” as opposed to “absolute 
priority.”119  Other practitioners began asserting something akin to 
the New Value Corollary.120  In some of those cases, as suggested by 
Boyd, unsecured creditors were given the same option to participate 
as equity holders.  However in general, the unsecured creditors could 
not afford the contribution price that sophisticated equity holders 
were able to pay.121 
4. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not initially apply to large 
corporations and explicitly excepted railroads from its provisions.122  
It was not until the 1930s that Congress enacted a federal 
reorganization statute for large corporations as a reaction to the 
Great Depression that started in 1929.123  In 1933, Congress enacted 
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act for railroads and in 1934 Congress 
enacted section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act to apply the corporate 
                                                          
that “the Supreme Court [was] more insistent on the principle than it had been 
before”). 
 115. Id. at 972. 
 116. See id. at 973 (remarking that the firmly established practice of reorganization 
lawyers were destined to overcome the Court’s decree in Boyd); see also Markell, supra 
note 58, at 81 (noting that reorganizations involving the participation of equity 
owners remained prevalent even after Boyd). 
 117. Ayer, supra note 55, at 973. 
 118. See id. (indicating that managers used upset sales to quell dissent). 
 119. See id. (characterizing the relative priority theory as similar to the “share 
scheme” that existed before Boyd); see also Markell, supra note 58, at 82 (“[The theory 
of relative priority] did not require allocating participation rights according to the 
full amount of prereceivership claims.  Instead, it adjusted capital structure on the 
basis of entitlement to future income, assuming no acceleration of senior debt.  
Equity holders could participate only if the projected earnings of the reorganized 
company exceeded pre-receivership debt service.  Under the relative priority theory, 
therefore, shareholders who contributed new value through paid assessments could 
salvage at least some of their original investment.”). 
 120. Ayer, supra note 55, at 973. 
 121. See Markell, supra note 58, at 81-82 (explaining that the creditors’ purchase of 
the new entities’ securities provided much needed capital for the railroads). 
 122. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1440 (noting that the 1867 Bankruptcy Act, 
repealed in 1878, did not exclude railroads, and that some railroads filed under that 
Act). 
 123. Id. 
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reorganization provisions to other corporations.124  These sections 
provided “the judge shall confirm the plan if satisfied that . . . it is fair 
and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of 
creditors or stockholders and is feasible.”125  The Bankruptcy Act 
contained no clarification on what Congress meant by “fair and 
equitable.” 
5.  Case and the Absolute Priority Rule 
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,126 the United States 
Supreme Court held that the phrase “fair and equitable” in section 
77B of the Bankruptcy Act was meant to codify the “fixed principle” 
(or Absolute Priority Rule) set forth in equity receivership cases like 
Louisville Trust and Boyd.127  The Court noted that those cases 
established the “precedence to be accorded creditors over 
stockholders in reorganization plans.”128  Thus, determining whether 
a plan was “fair and equitable” was not merely a factor for the Court 
to consider, rather, it was a test wholly separate from any voting 
requirements; a “rule of full or absolute priority.”129 
Consequently, in Case, where stockholders received consideration 
under the plan before bondholders were paid in full, a unanimous 
Court held that the plan was improperly confirmed, notwithstanding 
that the bondholder who objected held merely $18,500 in face 
amount of bonds and that over ninety-two percent of all bondholders 
consented to the plan.130  Effectively, the Case decision meant that 
absent the consent of one-hundred percent of creditors, a 
reorganization could not be achieved at all if the Absolute Priority 
Rule was violated, regardless of meeting the consent requirements of 
the Bankruptcy Act. 
6.  The Chandler Act 
The Chandler Act of 1938 repealed the general corporate 
reorganization section of the Bankruptcy Act (section 77B) and 
                                                          
 124. Id. 
 125. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 77B(f)(1), Pub. L. No. 296, 48 Stat. 911, 919 
(repealed 1938) (emphasis added). 
 126. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
 127. Id. at 114-19 (holding that the “fixed principle,” enumerated in Boyd, was 
“firmly imbedded” in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).  Although the Bankruptcy Act was 
amended via the Chandler Act in 1938, see infra note 175, Case was decided under 
the pre-Chandler Act Bankruptcy Act, i.e., section 77B.  In any case, the Court noted 
that the “fair and equitable” criterion remained unchanged by the Chandler Act.  
Case, 308 U.S. at 119 n.14. 
 128. Id. at 115-16. 
 129. Id. at 117. 
 130. Id. at 111-14. 
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created three different chapters of reorganization:  Chapter 10 for 
public companies, Chapter 11 for smaller compositions, and Chapter 
12 for real estate partnerships.131  The “fair and equitable” 
requirement applied to all three chapters.132 
7.  Further Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 
While the Absolute Priority Rule adopted in Case (where equity 
could in no circumstances receive a distribution if creditors were not 
paid in full) was practical in the case of a typical large public Chapter 
10 debtor, it proved unworkable in the case of a typical Chapter 11 
debtor—a distressed sole proprietorship or closely held 
corporation.133  In such cases, where management was often the sole 
equity holder of a “family corporation” and the creditors were its 
entity’s vendors, both parties had an interest in the existing 
management continuing to run the company.134  As a result, creditors 
generally were willing to accept less even though equity retained its 
interest.135  The Absolute Priority Rule, by prohibiting the old owners 
from retaining an equity interest, prevented the reorganization that 
all parties appeared to want in the Chapter 11 case.  Consequently, 
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1952 to remove “fair and 
equitable” (the Absolute Priority Rule) from the requirements for 
plan confirmation for Chapter 11 debtors,136 but retained the 
requirement for Chapter 10 cases.137 
8.  The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code.138  The drafters of 
the Bankruptcy Code had many choices regarding what type of 
Absolute Priority Rule to enact.  For example, they had to decide 
between (1) the expansive Absolute Priority Rule adopted in Case,139 
which would apply on a creditor-by-creditor basis even if all classes 
                                                          
 131. See Markell, supra note 7, at 232 (noting that section 77, which had applied to 
railroads, was not changed by the Chandler Act). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 977 (explaining that this was workable public policy 
in large corporations, “where equity ownership might come and go”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952) (repealed 1978). 
 137. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 
1960, 1982 (1952), which noted that if the Bankruptcy Act was not amended in that 
way, “no individual debtor and, under Chapter 11, no corporate debtor where the 
stock ownership is substantially identical with management could effectuate an 
arrangement except by payment of the claim of all creditors in full”).  
 138. See generally Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (reviewing Congress’s enactment of 
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978). 
 139. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 106 (1939). 
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consented or (2) a narrower Absolute Priority Rule that would apply 
only if there was an objecting class.  Congress chose the latter.140  
They also had to decide whether to adopt a strong Absolute Priority 
Rule with no stated exceptions or a weaker Absolute Priority Rule 
with enumerated exceptions.  In this case, Congress chose the 
former.141 
House Document 137 (“1973 Report”),142 outlining the proposed 
statute of the National Bankruptcy Commission and serving as a basis 
for the Bankruptcy Code, actually included a much weakened 
Absolute Priority Rule.143  The 1973 Report proposed an Absolute 
Priority Rule that would have given courts broad powers to provide a 
distribution to old equity holders under various scenarios even when 
creditors were not paid in full.144  For example, it would have 
permitted a recovery to equity holders based on their contribution of 
“continued management . . . essential to the business” or other 
contributions beyond “money or money’s worth.”145  It also would 
have enabled the court to manipulate valuation,146 and it would have 
given old equity owners a chance to participate in the upside of the 
reorganized company for up to five years in the future (an option or 
warrant of sorts).147  This proposal was heavily criticized, leading 
Congress to reject it when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code.148  
                                                          
 140. See infra pp. 1362 (analyzing the Bankruptcy Code’s Absolute Priority Rule). 
 141. See infra Part II.A.9 (discussing the New Corollary Rule and its impact on the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code’s Absolute Priority Rule). 
 142. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON THE 
BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973) (recommending a 
proposed bill and containing related Commission studies). 
 143. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (explaining how the 1973 Report contained an 
insubstantial Absolute Priority Rule). 
 144. Id. 
 145. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 258. 
 146. The 1973 Report specifically proposed that courts find that 
there is a reasonable basis for the valuation on which the plan is based and the 
plan is fair and equitable in that there is a reasonable probability that the 
securities issued and other consideration distributed under the plan will fully 
compensate the respective classes of creditors and equity security holders of 
the debtor for their respective interests in the debtor or his property. 
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, LEG. HISTORY OF THE BANKR. REFORM ACT OF 1978 pt. 827 
(King 15th rev. ed. 1996) (emphasis added) (discussing proposed section 7-
310(d)(2)(B)).  The 1973 Report explains that “the court is allowed more leeway in 
arriving at an informed estimate of valuation in recognition of the difficulty of 
predicting future earnings and arriving at an appropriate capitalization rate, by the 
use of the phrases ‘reasonable basis for valuation’ and ‘reasonable probability’ of 
fully compensating prior claims and interests.”  Id. at App. Pt. 4-829. 
 147. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (suggesting that the Absolute Priority Rule 
proposed in the 1973 Report would have given equity owners “in effect, a sort of 
option or warrant” in the debtor’s fortunes if they improved within five years of the 
confirmation). 
 148. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 205-06 & n.5 (1988) 
(describing sources of criticism); Ayer, supra note 55, at 979 (stating that Congress 
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Instead, a modified version of the Absolute Priority Rule was codified 
by Congress in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code.149 
The Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code is a middle 
ground between the extremely loose standards proposed in the 1973 
Report and the rigid rule announced in Case.  Specifically, unlike in 
Case,150 where a plan that provided a distribution to equity owners 
could not be confirmed despite its overwhelming general acceptance 
by all parties,151 the Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code 
only applies in “cramdown” where an entire class objects to the 
plan.152  It explicitly does not apply if all classes vote to accept the 
plan. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not give an individual creditor 
the right to challenge a distribution to equity if its class accepted the 
plan, it does protect the individual creditor from the tyranny of a 
majority that might agree to give away too much.  Specifically, 
Congress adopted the “Best Interests Test” to ensure that a court 
could not confirm the plan over the objection of a creditor if that 
creditor did not receive at least as much under the plan as it would in 
a liquidation.153 
Essentially, the Bankruptcy Code establishes a two-tier entitlement 
system.154  First, the proceeds, up to the liquidation value of the 
debtor, are distributed in strict conformance with the priority 
scheme.155  Any creditor can defeat a plan that does not provide it 
with its entitled liquidation share.156  Second, proceeds in excess of 
                                                          
abandoned the Absolute Priority Rule proposed in the 1973 Report when it enacted 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 because many legal scholars criticized the Absolute 
Priority Rule in law review articles). 
 149. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000) (“[T]he holder of any claim or 
interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the 
plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property . . . .”). 
 150. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
 151. See id. at 114 (“At the outset it should be stated that where a plan is not fair 
and equitable as a matter of law it cannot be approved by the court even though the 
percentage of the various classes of security holders required by section 77B, sub. f 
for confirmation of the plan has consented.”). 
 152. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (instructing the court to confirm a plan upon the 
request of a proponent of the plan if the plan “does not discriminate unfairly, and is 
fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired 
under, and has not accepted, the plan”). 
 153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (“[a court can only confirm a plan if w]ith 
respect to each impaired class of claims or interests . . . each holder of a claim or 
interest of such class (i) has accepted the plan; or (ii) will receive or retain under the 
plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date 
of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or 
retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title on such date.”). 
 154. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (providing requirements for reorganization plans). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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the liquidation value are negotiated among the debtor, creditors, and 
often equity holders, and these proceeds are determined by requisite 
majority votes of the classes.157 
Congress viewed Chapter 11 reorganization as a composition, or 
agreement among all stakeholders.158  As such, the Bankruptcy Code 
encourages the negotiation of a mutually beneficial plan of 
reorganization and retains flexibility for various potential outcomes 
depending on the circumstances of the case.  In some cases, for 
example, creditors may find it beneficial to provide a distribution to 
the old equity holders to avoid a valuation fight or encourage the old 
equity holders to stay and manage the reorganized debtor, a primary 
objective being a consensual plan.159 
One commentator described the incentive system created by the 
Bankruptcy Code: 
The debtor [who is given the exclusive right to propose a plan and 
solicit acceptances thereon for a period at the outset of the cases] 
must make an offer attractive enough to avoid rejection by a 
creditor class which, if it occurred, would be followed either by the 
absolute priority required in a cramdown or by a liquidation.  On 
the other side, the creditors risk liquidation and consequent loss of 
any share of a going concern surplus if they fail to come to terms.  
The theory is that the parties will bargain for a composition result 
which divides the going concern surplus to their mutual 
advantage.160 
Similarly, another commentator described the tension underlying 
the Absolute Priority Rule and the ambiguity surrounding its 
application.  He argues that, in theory, the application of the 
Absolute Priority Rule should be a simple concept:  if a debtor 
                                                          
 157. See Markell, supra note 58, at 88 (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 
changed the Absolute Priority Rule by allowing the remaining value of the debtor to 
be allocated by votes within and among different classes once the creditor received 
its liquidation value). 
 158. See John C. McCoid, II, Discharge:  The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy 
History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 189 (1996) (tracing the history of bankruptcy laws, 
primarily as they relate to the concept of discharge).  McCoid’s central premise is 
that bankruptcy has evolved from a simple creditor collection remedy (that differed 
from other creditor collection remedies only in its encouragement of ratable 
distribution) into a “statutorily mandated composition,” which is “an exchange of the 
collection and distribution of assets to the creditors in which the debtor cooperated 
in return for a release from further obligation on prebankruptcy debts.”  Id. at 164-
65.  McCoid argues that in determining what the terms of a bankruptcy should be, 
one must “[view] bankruptcy as a form of composition rather than as a collective 
collection device.”  Id. at 165. 
 159. See id. at 189-90 (stating that the theory behind the Bankruptcy Code is that 
parties will negotiate a plan which will fairly allocate the going concern surplus value 
of the debtor to all of the parties). 
 160. Id. at 190. 
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company is insolvent, its owners (i.e., the equity) cannot receive a 
distribution.161  If the company is solvent and can pay all of its 
creditors in full, then the owners take what is left over.162  He points to 
where this “simple dichotomy” unravels:  if the value of the business is 
worth more under the management of the current owners or if there 
is uncertainty (or at least arguable uncertainty) that the owners may 
exploit to obtain concessions.163  Under one of those scenarios, or if 
the new owners are willing to pay new value to obtain a stake in the 
reorganized company, then it may be appropriate for the equity 
holders to receive consideration even though all creditors may not be 
paid in full.164 
9.  The development of the New Value Corollary 
The “New Value Corollary” is another method by which creative 
restructuring professionals have been able to avoid a rigid application 
of the Absolute Priority Rule.  The professionals argue that old equity 
holders should be allowed to retain an interest in the reorganized 
company, not “on account of” their old equity interests (as this is 
expressly prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)), but as a result of new 
value being contributed by the equity holders.  Understanding this 
New Value Corollary is a prerequisite to analysis of the gifting 
doctrine. 
The principal United States Supreme Court cases that have 
discussed the Absolute Priority Rule after the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code have done so in connection with the New Value 
Corollary.165  Like the gifting doctrine, the New Value Corollary is not 
in the Bankruptcy Code.  Nonetheless, courts have generally accepted 
its validity.  This is because they find that if the conditions for the 
New Value Corollary are satisfied, the distribution to the junior 
stakeholder falls outside of the scope of the Absolute Priority Rule.  
As such, the New Value Corollary illustrates that the gifting scenario 
                                                          
 161. See Markell, supra note 58, at 70 (addressing different views on the status and 
application of the current Absolute Priority Rule). 
 162. See id. (discussing the basic premise that creditors’ interests take priority over 
equity holders’ interests). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (explaining ways that owners may continue their participation in the 
reorganized entity). 
 165. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. La Salle St. P’ship, 526 
U.S. 434, 448-49 (1999) (finding that legislative history does not bar the New Value 
Corollary exception to the Absolute Priority Rule found in the Bankruptcy Code); 
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (finding that the New 
Value Corollary exception should not be expanded beyond the Court’s decisions at 
the time Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978). 
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also falls outside of the scope of the Absolute Priority Rule and 
should likewise be accepted. 
The roots of the New Value Corollary appear in the early Supreme 
Court cases analyzing the Absolute Priority Rule.  Both Boyd166 and 
Case167 suggest that there may be situations in which old equity can 
participate in the new debtor by contributing new value.  In loose 
dicta, the Boyd Court approved such a scenario, as long as the same 
opportunity to participate was given to other stakeholders.  It noted 
that its decision did not mean it was necessary 
to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stockholders 
retaining an interest in the reorganized company.  His interest can 
be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds 
or preferred stock.  If he declines a fair offer he is left to protect 
himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having 
refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be 
heard in a court of equity to attack it.168 
Citing Boyd, the Court in Case recognized that providing new equity 
by allowing old equity holders an opportunity to participate by 
infusing cash was not only permissible, it could be desirable, as old 
equity may be the only or best source of needed cash for the 
enterprise.169  The Court was clear, however, that to avoid running 
afoul of the Absolute Priority Rule, the interest the old shareholders 
received in the new company would have to be “reasonably 
equivalent” to the proposed contribution.170  The Court found that 
this additional cash infusion was not only permissible but necessary.171  
This exception, commonly known as the “New Value Corollary,” was 
not codified in the Bankruptcy Code but has generally survived as a 
judicially determined corollary (or exception) to the Absolute 
Priority Rule.172 
                                                          
 166. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913). 
 167. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939). 
 168. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508. 
 169. Case, 308 U.S. at 121 (clarifying that under certain circumstances 
stockholders may participate in the reorganization plan of an insolvent debtor 
(citing both Boyd, 228 U.S. at 504, and Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union 
Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926))). 
 170. Case, 308 U.S. at 121-22 (“[T]o accord ‘the creditor his full right of priority 
against the corporate assets’ where the debtor is insolvent, the stockholder’s 
participation must be based on a contribution in money or in money’s worth, 
reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the 
stockholder.”). 
 171. See id. at 121 (establishing that no objection can be made to old stockholder 
participation in a reorganization where the success of the reorganization depends on 
the infusion of new capital and where old stockholders make a fresh contribution in 
exchange for a reasonably equivalent participation). 
 172. See Harvey R. Miller, John J. Rapisardi & Reginald A. Greene, Leaving Old 
Questions Unanswered and Raising New Ones:  The Supreme Court Furthers The New Value 
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On two occasions the United States Supreme Court has had the 
opportunity to rule on the continued vitality and scope of the New 
Value Corollary, but has failed to do so.  In Norwest Bank Worthington 
v. Ahlers,173 the debtors, who operated a family farm, opposed a 
motion for relief from an automatic stay prohibiting the secured 
creditor from foreclosing on its collateral.174  Because the secured 
creditor was undersecured, the bankruptcy court granted the motion, 
holding that the debtors did not retain an equity interest in the 
property, as they could not, given the Absolute Priority Rule, propose 
a confirmable plan that would provide them with an interest in the 
property.175  The district court agreed.176  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed and, citing Case, held that the Absolute Priority Rule 
did not bar a plan that would allow the debtors to retain an interest 
in the property subject to the secured lender’s liens “if they 
contributed ‘money or money’s worth’ to the reorganized 
enterprise.”177  It further held that the debtors’ “future contributions 
of ‘labor, experience, and expertise’ . . . have ‘value’” and were 
sufficient to constitute “money or money’s worth.”178 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit.179  
However, despite a specific request from the United States as amicus 
curiae, the Court refused to rule that the New Value Corollary 
discussed in Case had not survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code.180  Rather, it noted that “even if the [Case] exception to the 
[A]bsolute [P]iority [R]ule has survived enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code, this exception does not encompass [debtors’] promise[s] to 
contribute their ‘labor, experience, and expertise’ to the reorganized 
enterprise . . .  [which] is inadequate to gain the benefit of this 
                                                          
Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle 
Street Partnership, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 553, 569-78 (2000) (discussing the 
development and evolution of the New Value Corollary (Exception)). 
 173. 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
 174. See id. at 199-200 (detailing that the debtors obtained an automatic stay of 
their creditors’ replevin action when they filed a petition for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 175. See id. at 200 (stating that the bankruptcy court upheld the creditors’ motion 
for relief from the automatic stay because the debtors’ reorganization plan was 
infeasible). 
 176. See id. (explaining that the district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s 
initial decision to grant the creditors relief from the automatic stay). 
 177. Id. at 201. 
 178. Id. at 203 (citing In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 402 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
 179. See id. at 206 (“[W]e find no support in the Code or our previous decisions 
for the Court of Appeals’ application of the absolute priority rule in this case.”). 
 180. See id. at 203 n.3 (contending that it does not need to determine if any 
exceptions exist to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority rule to resolve the 
current dispute). 
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exception.”181  In more colloquial terms, sweat equity does not rise to 
money or money’s worth.  Thus, the Court noted that there are no 
exceptions to the Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code 
beyond those that existed in its case law at the time of the 1978 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.182 
In North LaSalle,183 the Supreme Court once again balked at 
definitively stating whether or not the New Value Corollary survived 
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.184  The Court made clear, 
however, that if a New Value Corollary exists, the consideration given 
to the former equity holders in exchange for new value must be 
subject to a “market test” (i.e., the opportunity to contribute value in 
exchange for such distribution must be offered to others in a 
competitive manner, or others must be permitted to file competing 
plans of reorganization).185 
North LaSalle was a single-asset partnership real estate case where 
the debtor proposed a plan in which the bank, an undersecured 
creditor, was to receive payment over time for the secured portion of 
its claim and a payment of approximately 16% of value for its 
separately classified (unsecured) deficiency claim.186  The other class 
of unsecured creditors was to be paid 100% of their allowed claims.187  
Under the plan certain former partners of the debtor (old equity) 
would contribute to the reorganized debtor a present value of 
approximately $4.1 million over time in exchange for all the equity of 
the reorganized debtor.188  The opportunity to contribute value to 
participate in the reorganized company was exclusive to the former 
                                                          
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 206 (holding that the language of the Bankruptcy Code and its 
legislative history bar any expansion of exceptions to the Absolute Priority Rule 
beyond those that existed in 1978, when Congress enacted the Code). 
 183. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 
(1999). 
 184. See id. at 454 (maintaining that the Court will not decide in this case whether 
it will recognize the New Value Corollary). 
 185. See id. at 454-55 (discussing reasons why the New Value Corollary must allow 
others, besides the debtor’s partners, an opportunity to compete for equity or 
propose an alternative reorganization plan, otherwise the New Value Corollary is 
doomed). 
 186. See id. at 440 (describing key elements of the debtor’s plan).  Section 506(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code defines secured and unsecured status providing that 
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the 
estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . ., and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is 
less than the amount of such allowed claim 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000). 
 187. North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 440. 
 188. See id. (observing that the plan allowed certain of the debtor’s former 
partners to contribute $6.125 million in new capital over the course of five years). 
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partners.189  The plan proponents relied upon the New Value 
Corollary. 
After the bank voted to reject the plan, the debtor sought 
confirmation under the cramdown provision of § 1129(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.190  The bank argued that the plan violated the 
Absolute Priority Rule on its face because the plan provided for old 
equity to become the equity holder of the reorganized debtor while 
its unsecured claim was not satisfied in whole.191  However, the 
bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, and the district court and the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.192  The Supreme 
Court then granted certiorari to resolve the split in the courts of 
appeals over the New Value Corollary and whether it survived the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.193 
The Supreme Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code did not refer 
to or provide for the New Value Corollary.194  The legislative history, 
however, was not clear regarding whether this omission meant that 
Congress rejected the New Value Corollary.  Specifically, although 
early drafts of the House version of the bill that would become the 
Bankruptcy Code contained explicit language condoning the New 
Value Corollary, the House bill that emerged did not contain such 
language.195  The Court did not, however, view this exclusion as a 
definitive rejection of the continuing viability of the New Value 
Corollary.  Rather, because the language of the Absolute Priority Rule 
prohibited old equity holders from receiving any consideration “on 
account of” their old equity interests if senior classes had not been 
satisfied or consented, the Court concluded that the New Value 
                                                          
 189. See id. at 440-41 (discussing that the bank objected to this provision and 
blocked confirmation of the plan). 
 190. See id. (allowing the debtor to force the plan on the dissenting class). 
 191. See id. at 442 (maintaining that the bank read the Absolute Priority Rule as 
conflicting with the debtor’s plan because it allowed old equity holders in the debtor 
to have property even though the bank’s unsecured claim was not paid in full). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 443.  The Ninth and Seventh Circuits (the latter in North LaSalle) 
had upheld confirmation of plans that provided equity with a distribution under the 
New Value Corollary.  See id. (citing In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 910-16 (9th 
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1039, vacatur denied and appeal dismissed as moot, 513 
U.S. 18 (1994)).  In contrast, the Second and Fourth Circuits had disapproved 
similar plans, although they did not explicitly reject the New Value Corollary.  See id. 
(citing In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners, L.P., 138 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 
1998), In re Bryson Props., XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
 194. See North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 446 (observing that Congress had an opportunity 
to include the New Value Corollary into the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, but it chose not 
to address it). 
 195. See id. at 446-47 (recounting that after an extensive mark-up session, the 
House produced a bill, which eventually would become the Bankruptcy Code, that 
no longer contained the New Value Corollary). 
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Corollary could arguably be implied from the language of the 
Bankruptcy Code.196 
The Court then discussed the various possible interpretations of 
the phrase “on account of,” rejecting “in exchange for” and “in 
satisfaction of” and settling on “because of.”197  The Court also 
examined two potential interpretations of the causal connection 
required to trigger the Absolute Priority Rule.  First, it looked at a 
definition that would hold any distribution of consideration to old 
equity holders to be “on account of” their old equity interests (an 
interpretation that would essentially destroy the New Value 
Corollary).198  Second, a less restrictive definition that would permit 
equity holders to receive a distribution as long as the distribution was 
adding at least as much value as could be obtained from an outside 
source.199 
The Court strongly hinted that it favored the latter interpretation 
and that the New Value Corollary, as a result, was a valid corollary to 
the Absolute Priority Rule.200  However, the Court refused to decide 
the issue because the plan in this case failed even under the more 
permissive definition.201  Specifically, the Court found that regardless 
of the value provided by the old equity holders in North LaSalle, the 
plan was flawed.  It violated the Absolute Priority Rule by giving such 
holders the exclusive right to purchase the equity in the reorganized 
debtor, a valuable right, because of their equity holdings.202  In 
                                                          
 196. See id. at 447-49 (finding that it is possible that the Absolute Priority Rule 
found in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 may contain the New Value Corollary). 
 197. See id. at 449-51 (arguing that “on account of” means “because of” based on 
other provisions in the statute where these two phrases mean the same thing). 
 198. See id. at 451-53 (criticizing the definition proposed by the government, 
which contended that any relationship between earlier interests and retained 
property will create a bar to a plan providing for retained property, based on the text 
of the Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code). 
 199. See id. at 453-54 (suggesting that this more flexible reading of “on account of” 
would bar a plan if old equity obtained or preserved an ownership interest for a price 
less than what others in the market would have paid). 
 200. The Court noted that allowing a New Value Corollary would “reconcile the 
two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going concerns and 
maximizing property available to satisfy creditors.”  Id. at 453.  “A truly full value 
transaction . . . would pose no threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any 
reorganization, provided of course that the contribution be in cash or be realizable 
money’s worth.”  Id. at 453-54. 
 201. See id. at 454 (rejecting the need to decide which definition of “on account 
of” should prevail in this case because it is unnecessary for its decision). 
 202. See id. at 454-55 (“At the moment of the plan’s approval the Debtor’s partners 
necessarily enjoyed an exclusive opportunity that was in no economic sense 
distinguishable from the advantage of the exclusively entitled offeror or option 
holder.  This opportunity should, first of all, be treated as an item of property in its 
own right.”).  The Court saw no justification for old equity having the exclusive 
option: 
If the price to be paid for the equity interest is the best obtainable, old equity 
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connection with the implementation of the New Value Corollary, the 
Court, in dicta, noted that an exclusive option was inherently flawed 
because it required the bankruptcy court, rather than the market, to 
make the determination of whether the value provided by old equity 
was reasonably equivalent to the consideration to be received.203  The 
Court thus held that if the New Value Corollary exists, the old equity 
holders cannot be permitted to obtain equity in a reorganized debtor 
unless the opportunity to acquire the equity is subject to a market 
test.204 
Lower courts and the Bar have found the Court’s opinion in North 
LaSalle less than clear.  Not only was the circuit split on the existence 
of the New Value Corollary left unresolved, but the decision also 
raised new questions about what exactly a “market test” would 
entail.205  For those courts that recognize the New Value Corollary, 
the generally accepted elements are that the value be “(1) new, 
(2) substantial, (3) money or money’s worth, (4) necessary for a 
successful reorganization, and (5) reasonably equivalent to the value 
or interest received.”206  Accordingly, while the New Value Corollary 
may put junior or equity interests back into “play” in some Chapter 
11 scenarios, its requirements are difficult to meet. 
B.  The Unfair Discrimination Prohibition 
The Unfair Discrimination Prohibition (as well as the rules 
regarding classification of claims) pursues many of the same 
equitable objectives as the Absolute Priority Rule, but it does so by 
monitoring the plan treatment of similarly situated creditors.  
Whereas the Absolute Priority Rule guards against unfair treatment 
between creditors of different priorities (a vertical test), the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition is concerned with ensuring that similarly 
                                                          
does not need the protection of exclusiveness (unless to trump an equal 
offer from someone else); if it is not the best, there is no apparent reason for 
giving old equity a bargain.  There is no reason, that is, unless the very 
purpose of the whole transaction is, at least in part, to do old equity a favor. 
Id. at 456. 
 203. See id. at 457 (arguing that one of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’s important 
changes is that it limits a court’s responsibility for making value judgments). 
 204. Id. at 457-58 (contending that for the sake of statutory consistency and policy 
reasons favoring competition, old equity holders cannot obtain new equity unless 
their position is subject to a market test). 
 205. See Robert J. Keach, LaSalle, the “Market Test” and Competing Plans:  Still in the 
Fog, 21-Jan AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (2003) (suggesting that the existence of the New 
Value Corollary and its corresponding “market test” remain unresolved issues). 
 206. See, e.g., In re Hoffinger Indus., 321 B.R. 498, 510 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005) 
(citing Bonner Mall P’ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall P’ship), 
2 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
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situated creditors are treated equally, absent a compelling reason to 
do otherwise (a horizontal test).207 
1.  Equity receiverships 
Like the Absolute Priority Rule, the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition grew out of the equity receiverships of railroads.208  While 
railroad secured bondholders and stockholders were squeezing out 
unsecured creditors through “insider” receivership sales (the 
behavior that led to the Absolute Priority Rule, as discussed above),209 
they were also forcing out minority secured creditors and equity 
holders that were not part of the syndicate to reacquire the railroad 
company.  For example, while unsecured creditors were getting paid 
nothing, and the investor syndicate was getting back its company at 
bargain prices, other secured creditors and stockholders were being 
forced to take their share of the proceeds of the receivership sale, 
which, as noted above, were generally much less than the market 
value of the assets.210 
Unsecured creditors initially used fraudulent transfer laws in an 
attempt to protect their interests before the Absolute Priority Rule 
was created.  In contrast, the secured creditors who were left out did 
not want the receivership sales voided as fraudulent; they just wanted 
a larger recovery.  Instead of being paid out in cash (at a discount), 
they wanted a share of the reorganized company.  Over time, courts 
heard their pleas and often agreed that equity required equality of 
                                                          
 207. See Markell, supra note 7, at 231 (contending that Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition cases present an interesting dichotomy between the vertical and 
horizontal equity tests, but cautioning that at the time these tests were developed 
they were not formally recognized). 
 208. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 41-43 (explaining that a large portion 
of equity receivership law is rooted in the historic treatment of insolvent railroads); 
Markell, supra note 7, at 228-29 (discussing the long history of statutory provisions 
that guard against plans that discriminate unfairly). 
 209. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the history and evolution of the Absolute 
Priority Rule with regard to equity receiverships). 
 210. See Markell, supra note 7, at 229-31 (exploring the origin of the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition).  In Part I.A of Markell’s article, he uses Ring v. New 
Auditorium Pier Co., 77 A. 1054 (N.J. Ch. 1910) as an example of unfair 
discrimination.  Id. at 230.  In that case, Ring was a bondholder that held $5,000 of a 
$75,000 secured bond issuance.  Id.  Ring was not part of the bondholder syndicate 
that purchased the reorganizing company for only $10,000 at the foreclosure sale.  
Id.  Instead of what would have been his share of the new bonds issued by the 
reorganized company, he was scheduled to receive only his share of the $10,000.  Id.  
Ring sued for his share of the new bonds and the court ruled in his favor.  Id.  It cited 
the lack of full notice to Ring of the foreclosure and the plan to repurchase the 
company as decisive equitable factors.  Id.  Markell concludes that in Ring and other 
cases, courts “recognized that regardless of the effect on other classes of creditors 
and stakeholders, reorganizations had to be fair within each class created.”  Id. at 
231. 
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distribution, and, therefore, that they should receive a share of the 
reorganized company if other similarly situated creditors were also 
receiving a share of the reorganized company.211 
2.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
Section 77 (the railroad provision) did not initially contain an 
unfair discrimination prohibition when it was added to the 
Bankruptcy Act in 1933.212  However, when § 77B, which applied to 
business corporations, was added in 1934, it required that plans not 
discriminate unfairly.213  A year later, Congress amended § 77 to 
mirror the confirmation requirements of § 77B, which included the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.214  While these sections provided 
that to confirm a reorganization plan, the court had to find that the 
plan did not discriminate unfairly, no explanation of the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition was provided.215 
3.  The Chandler Act 
In 1938, Congress enacted the Chandler Act, which replaced § 77B 
(the general corporate reorganization provision) with three new 
debtor relief provisions:  Chapters 10, 11, and 12.216  The Railroad 
provision, § 77, was not changed by the Chandler Act.217  The 
Chandler Act did not include the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition 
in its new chapters, although the sparse legislative history suggests 
that the omission was less intentional than it was a result of an 
erroneous conflation of the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition with 
the Absolute Priority Rule by the Act’s drafters.218  Specifically, the 
following questionable explanation was provided: 
Subsection (2) of Section 221 [of the Chandler Act], derived from 
Section 77B(f)(1) [of the former Bankruptcy Act], provides, as a 
condition to confirmation of a plan, that the judge be satisfied that 
it is ‘fair and equitable,’ and ‘feasible.’  Implicit in the former 
                                                          
 211. See id. at 230-31 (explaining that since receivership has equity origins, the 
process needs to provide equal opportunities for shareholders with similar interests). 
 212. See id. at 232 (noting that railroad reorganization plans only had to be “fair” 
and not necessarily “equitable” according to the language of section 77 when 
Congress enacted it in 1933). 
 213. See id. at 232 (discussing how section 77B required plans to be both “fair and 
equitable, and not discriminate unfairly”). 
 214. See id. 
 215. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 42 (stating that Congress refused to 
discuss what unfair discrimination meant). 
 216. See id. (citing Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840). 
 217. See Markell, supra note 7, at 233. 
 218. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 42 (citing S. REP. NO. 75-1916, at 35-36 
(1938)). 
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phrase is a prohibition against any unfair discrimination in the 
plan in favor of any creditors or stockholders and the express 
statement to that effect in Section 77B is therefore unnecessary.219 
4.  Pre-code application of the unfair discrimination prohibition 
Nevertheless, courts still entertained confirmation objections from 
creditors arguing that, under the proposed plan, they had been 
unfairly discriminated against.  In two cases in the 1940s, American 
United Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park220 and Mason v. 
Paradise Irrigation District,221 the Supreme Court suggested that the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition survived the enactment of the 
Chandler Act.  Both of the cases related to municipal bankruptcies 
under Chapter 9.222 
In Avon Park, a fiscal agent performed services for the debtor and 
received payments pursuant to the plan that objecting similarly 
situated creditors argued went beyond mere compensation for 
services and amounted to unfair discrimination.  The Court agreed 
and reversed the confirmation of the plan, stating: 
Compositions under Ch. IX, like compositions under the old §12, 
envisage equality of treatment of creditors.  Under that section and its 
antecedents, a composition would not be confirmed where one 
creditor was obtaining some special favor or inducement not 
accorded the others, whether that consideration moved from the 
debtor or from another . . . In absence of a finding that the 
aggregate emoluments receivable by the [fiscal agent] interests 
were reasonable, measured by the services rendered, it cannot be 
said that the consideration accruing to them, under or as a 
consequence of the adoption of the plan, likewise accrued to all 
other creditors, of the same class.  Accordingly, the imprimatur of 
the federal court should not have been placed on this plan.223 
In Mason, the Court heard a similar objection by dissenting 
creditors; however, the Court found the discrimination in that plan 
was justified.  The Court stated: 
[i]t has long been recognized in reorganization law that those who 
put new money into the distressed enterprise may be given a 
participation in the reorganization plan reasonably equivalent to 
their contribution . . . . Without the inducement new money could 
not be obtained . . . . The [preferred creditor] contributes 
                                                          
 219. Id. 
 220. 311 U.S. 138 (1940). 
 221. 326 U.S. 536 (1946). 
 222. These two cases also figure prominently in the development of the rules on 
classification.  See supra note 23. 
 223. Avon Park, 311 U.S. at 148-49 (emphasis added).  
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something that the [dissenting bondholder] does not . . . . That 
difference warrants a difference in treatment.224 
Thus, as long as the special treatment to the co-equal creditor was 
in exchange for additional value provided by the creditor, such 
treatment was deemed proper, justified, and fair.225 
5.  The Bankruptcy Code 
Although it does not appear that the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition was ever considered by an appellate court between Mason 
and the adoption of the proposal of the Bankruptcy Code,226 the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code codified the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition in 
cramdown situations.  The legislative history of the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition in the Bankruptcy Code does not provide 
much guidance as to Congress’s intentions.  It appears that much 
more thought went into the Absolute Priority Rule and that the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was often confused with the 
Absolute Priority Rule during the drafting of section 1129(b).227  
Ultimately, Congress placed the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition in 
§ 1129(b)(1) as an additional requirement to be met in cramdown 
situations along with the Absolute Priority Rule.228  In floor comments 
discussing the proposed Bankruptcy Code, its sponsors noted that the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was added for “clarity,” although it 
is not clear at all what is meant by clarity.229 
The only somewhat helpful illustration of the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition is found in the House Report; however, it 
is only useful in the subordination context.  It states that “[f]rom the 
perspective of unsecured trade claims, there is no unfair 
discrimination as long as the total consideration given all other 
classes of equal rank does not exceed the amount that would result 
from an exact aliquot distribution.”230  The House Report essentially 
explains that distributions to unsecured classes, which are different 
                                                          
 224. Mason, 326 U.S. at 542-43.  
 225. Id. at 543 (noting that the plan must be transparent and cannot discriminate 
unfairly). 
 226. See Markell, supra note 7, at 235. 
 227. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 37-39. 
 228. See id. at 38. 
 229. See Markell, supra note 7, at 236 n.47 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 & 34,006 
(1978) (statements of Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeConcini) (“The requirement of the 
House bill that a plan not ‘discriminate unfairly’ with respect to a class is included 
for clarify; the language in the House report interpreting that requirement, in the 
context of subordinated debentures, applies equally under the requirements of 
section 1129(b)(1) of the House amendment.”). 
 230. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 39-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 
417 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6373). 
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from one another as a result of the enforcement of subordination 
agreements between senior and junior creditors, do not violate the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, but suggests that any other 
difference in treatment would be unfair and, consequently, 
prohibited.231 
6.  Unfair discrimination in practice 
Courts considering the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition have 
applied different interpretations to it, which can be grouped into 
four different broad categories:  (1) courts that apply the rule strictly 
so that all similarly situated creditors are required to receive the exact 
same treatment; (2) courts that apply the rule only in the context of 
subordinated claims or interest; (3) courts that permit discrimination 
if it is fair and apply some form of a four-part test to determine 
fairness; and (4) courts that similarly permit fair discrimination but, 
rather than use the four-part test, apply a reasonableness standard.232 
A minority of cases apply a strict reading to the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition that bars any discrimination whatsoever.233  
                                                          
 231. See id. at 39-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 417 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6373).  The following is an excerpt from the House Report: 
[I]f trade creditors, senior debt, and subordinate debt are each owed $100 
and the plan proposes to pay the trade debt $15, the senior debt $30, and 
the junior debt $0, the plan would not unfairly discriminate against the trade 
debt nor would any other allocation of consideration under the plan 
between the senior and junior debt be unfair as to the trade debt as long as 
the aggregate consideration is less than $30 . . . 
Application of the test from the perspective of senior debt is best illustrated 
by the plan that proposed to pay trade debt $15, senior debt $25, and junior 
debt $0.  Here the senior debt is being unfairly discriminated against with 
respect to the equal trade debt even though the trade debt receives less than 
the senior debt.  The discrimination arises from the fact that the senior debt 
is entitled to the rights of the junior debt which in this example entitle [sic] 
the senior debt to share on a 2:1 basis with the trade debt. 
Finally, it is necessary to interpret the first criterion from the perspective of 
subordinated debt.  The junior debt is subrogated to the rights of senior 
debt once the senior debt is paid in full.  Thus, while the plan that pays trade 
debt $15, senior debt $25, and junior debt $0 is not unfairly discriminatory 
against the junior debt, a plan that proposes to pay trade debt $55, senior 
debt $100, and junior debt $1, would be unfairly discriminatory.  In order to 
avoid discriminatory treatment against the junior debt, at least $10 would 
have to be recovered by such debt under those facts. 
Id. 
 232. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 46-48. 
 233. See, e.g., In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 1989), aff’d, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1274 
(5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a plan that accorded the dissenting trade creditor class 
the same treatment as another class of equal priority creditors—the deficiency claim 
of undersecured secured creditors).  When the dissenting class objected that the 
estate could afford to provide it with a better recovery, the court noted that, since a 
better recovery would come at the expense of the recovery of the similarly situated 
class of creditors, such a “plan would prima facie ‘unfairly discriminate.’”  The court 
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This is the most conservative approach, because if the court does not 
allow any “discrimination” whatsoever, then it can hardly be 
“unfair.”234  The rigidity of this interpretation of unfair discrimination 
ultimately undercuts the rehabilitative goals of the Bankruptcy Code 
by not allowing debtors some flexibility in the “cramdown” context 
and appears to ignore the fact that the term discrimination in 
§ 1129(b)(1) is modified by the word “unfair.”235 
A different minority of courts has taken a similar strict approach to 
the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.  These courts hold that the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition only applies if the plan 
inappropriately involves subordination of claims or interests.236  
Under this rationale, disparate treatment among classes of creditors 
with equal priority is not subject to scrutiny by the court.237  If the first 
line of cases was too restrictive then certainly this line of cases is too 
relaxed and offers debtors an opportunity to abuse the “cramdown” 
power. 
The majority of courts, however, permit some discrimination, as 
long as they find that the discrimination is fair.  Most of these courts 
apply some variation of a multiple-part test to determine if 
discrimination is fair, while other courts forego the rigidity of a test 
and instead make a general equitable inquiry.238  The court in In re 
WorldCom articulated a variation of the multiple-part test for unfair 
                                                          
relied on legislative history from the House Report, which provided, in an example 
explaining the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition:  “From the perspective of 
unsecured trade claims, there is no unfair discrimination as long as the total 
consideration given all other classes of equal rank does not exceed the amount that 
would result from an exact aliquot distribution.”  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 
416). 
 234. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 47 (noting that “by recognizing no 
room for differences in treatment among similarly situated claimants, the approach 
appears to equate ‘discrimination’ with ‘unfairness,’ rendering the latter 
redundant”). 
 235. Id. 
 236. See, e.g., In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
the alleged disparate treatment between two shareholders regarding their voting 
rights was irrelevant because the distribution did not involve subordination); In re 
Martin, 66 B.R. 921, 929-30 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (finding disparate treatment 
between an oversecured creditor and other creditors regarding scheduling of 
payment irrelevant because it did not involve subordination); see also Denise R. 
Polivy, Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11:  A Comprehensive Compilation of Current Case 
Law, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 199-200 (referring to these cases as utilizing a 
“Restrictive Approach”). 
 237. This reading of the Code is rooted in the legislative history.  In re Acequia, 787 
F.2d at 1364 n.18 (citing Sponsors’ Remarks, 124 CONG. REC. Hll, 104 (daily ed. Sept. 
28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REC. S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 
1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)).  
 238. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 47-48 (describing how many courts use 
a four part test that is highly subjective in nature and that frequently leads to 
disparate results). 
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discrimination:  “To determine whether a plan discriminates unfairly, 
courts consider whether (1) there is a reasonable basis for 
discriminating, (2) the debtor cannot consummate the plan without 
the discrimination, (3) the discrimination is proposed in good faith, 
and (4) the degree of discrimination is in direct proportion to its 
rationale.”239 
In WorldCom, the debtors provided disparate treatment to equal 
priority classes based on different arguments the creditors in the 
classes would have regarding the effect of substantive consolidation 
on their claims.  Specifically, it appeared that the creditors of the 
former MCI subsidiaries might be prejudiced by substantive 
consolidation, as they relied on the credit of MCI, which appeared to 
have more value than the WorldCom entities.  The court permitted 
discrimination between classes, essentially providing a greater 
recovery to the creditors of the former MCI entities, noting such 
discrimination was justified as 
[a] mechanism that enables the Debtors to recognize the unique 
reliance and prejudice arguments of the holders of [three different 
types of claims], which those creditors, as parties that extended 
credit . . . , possess in relation to the substantive consolidation of 
the WorldCom Debtors[.  This] is a valid business justification and 
reasonable basis for the disparate treatment of [four different types 
of claims].240 
Also, the court held that “discrimination among [four classes] 
under the plan is not unfair because it is appropriate, reasonably 
proportional to the issues of the case and necessary to the 
reorganization.”241  The four-part test gives courts the flexibility to 
look at specific facts and the relationships of similarly situated 
creditors to the debtor and to the plan of reorganization, although it 
has been criticized for its lack of predictability, among other 
reasons.242 
Those courts that have been relatively open to discrimination but 
do not confine their reasoning to a multiple-part test typically 
                                                          
 239. In re WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 23861928, at *59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); cf. 
In re Snyders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 895-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (using 
a four-part test); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989). 
 240. In re WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *59. 
 241. Id. at *60. 
 242. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 47-48 (arguing, inter alia, that the test 
will encourage inappropriate hold-out behavior); Polivy, supra note 236, at 205-06 
(“The four-part test has its critics.  Some courts have criticized the test as adding to 
the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of unfair discrimination.  They point out 
the redundancy in the first and fourth prongs, which both ask whether the extent of 
discrimination is reasonable.”).  For a thorough critique of the four-part tests, see 
Markell, supra note 7, at 242-46. 
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examine the reasonableness and the achievability of a proposed 
plan.243  Generally, if the debtor presents an equitable rationale for 
the discrimination among co-equal classes of creditors, these courts 
will allow it.244  The enforcement of the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition in this context ends up being very similar to the four-part 
test discussed above, but allows for greater elasticity. 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GIFTING DOCTRINE 
As noted, the gifting doctrine did not emerge as a radical proposal.  
Rather, it developed slowly in incremental steps. 
A.  Legislative History of Gifting 
The legislative history leading up to the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code suggests that Congress was uncertain as to whether 
to permit a senior creditor to circumvent the Absolute Priority Rule 
or the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition by forgoing (or “gifting”) a 
portion of its distribution in favor of stockholders despite that 
intervening junior creditors would not be paid in full. 
A Senate report written prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code proposed that a senior creditor would be permitted to adjust 
the value of its disbursement in the plan for the benefit of equity 
holders despite that the junior creditors were not being paid in full 
under the plan.245  Subsequently, two key legislators of the Bankruptcy 
Code, Representative Don Edwards and Senator Dennis DeConcini 
explicitly rejected this proposal and stated that “[c]ontrary to the 
example contained in the Senate report, a senior class will not be 
able to give up value to a junior class over the dissent of an 
intervening class unless the intervening class receives the full amount, 
as opposed to value, of its claims or interests.”246 
                                                          
 243. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 48 (noting that “[this standard] 
embraces fundamentally the perspective of ‘I know it when I see it,’ and is thus 
unlikely to fulfill the underlying purposes of the unfair discrimination doctrine in 
any defined or systematic way”). 
 244. See In re Salen Suede, Inc., 219 B.R. 922, 933-34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) 
(“Whether a plan unfairly discriminates is tested by an objective standard . . . ; any 
discrimination must be supported by a legally acceptable rationale, and the extent of 
the discrimination must be necessary in light of the rationale.”); In re 203 N. LaSalle 
St. Ltd. P’ship, 190 B.R. 567, 585-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“[I]t is possible at least 
to lay a framework for measuring the fairness of a discrimination in Chapter 11 
plans.  First, any discrimination must be supported by a legally acceptable 
rationale . . . . Second, the extent of the discrimination must be necessary in light of 
the rationale.”), aff’d, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 
1997), rev’d on other grounds subnom. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. La 
Salle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
 245. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 127 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5913. 
 246. 124 CONG. REC. S. 34007 (Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 123 
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The House Report, in connection with the bill that became the 
Bankruptcy Code, described the effects of the Absolute Priority Rule, 
but was silent about whether it would apply to a gift by one group of 
creditors to the other: 
The court may confirm [a plan] over the dissent of a class of 
unsecured claims, including priority claims, only if the members of 
the class are unimpaired, if they will receive under the plan 
property of a value equal to the allowed amount of their unsecured 
claims, or if no class junior will share under the plan.  That is, if the 
class is impaired, then they must be paid in full or, if paid less than 
full, then no class junior may receive anything under the plan.  
This codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class on 
down.247 
Although the statements by the bill’s sponsors appear to suggest 
that they did not agree with the gifting concept, they are not 
authoritative.  There is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibiting 
creditors from agreeing to give up their distributions and transferring 
that consideration to other classes of claims or interests. 
B.  SPM 
The case of Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee v. Stern (In re SPM 
Manufacturing. Corp.)248 started the trend of condoning the ability of 
creditors to “gift” around the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.  
In SPM, the First Circuit held that creditors are generally free to do as 
they please with their bankruptcy dividends, including sharing them 
with other creditors, and that any resulting distribution does not 
violate the distribution scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.249  The facts 
in SPM clearly supported that conclusion. 
In SPM, the debtor owed $5.5 million to general unsecured 
creditors and $9 million to Citizens Savings Bank, the holder of a 
perfected first priority security interest in substantially all of the 
debtor’s assets.250  The IRS held an unsecured priority claim for 
$750,000, which was personally guaranteed by the debtor’s president 
and members of his family.251 
During the Chapter 11 case, in an effort to maximize the value of 
the debtor’s estate through cooperation, Citizens Savings Bank and 
                                                          
CONG. REC. H. 32408 (Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). 
 247. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6369.  
 248. 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 249. Id. at 1313. 
 250. Id. at 1307. 
 251. Id. 
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the official committee of unsecured creditors entered into a formal 
agreement providing that they would work together to formulate a 
plan of reorganization.252  In consideration, Citizens Savings Bank 
agreed to share whatever proceeds it received from its collateral 
security with general unsecured creditors in a specified manner.253  As 
a result of the agreement, general unsecured creditors would receive 
a dividend even though the priority unsecured tax creditors, 
including the IRS, would not.254 
After it became clear that SPM could not be successfully 
reorganized, the bankruptcy court appointed a receiver, the debtor’s 
assets were sold for $5 million, and the debtor’s Chapter 11 case was 
converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.255  Citizens Savings Bank and 
the creditors’ committee then filed a joint motion requesting 
distribution of the net sales proceeds to Citizens Savings Bank on 
account of its first priority lien and providing that Citizens Savings 
Bank would distribute a portion of the net proceeds to the creditors’ 
committee in accordance with the agreement of the parties.256  The 
debtor and its management, which would have been personally liable 
for whatever portion of the IRS claim that was not paid out of the 
estate, objected, arguing that the participation of general unsecured 
creditors in the liquidation proceeds ahead of priority tax creditors 
violated the distribution scheme under the Bankruptcy Code.257 
The bankruptcy court agreed and ordered that the net proceeds be 
distributed to Citizens Savings Bank and that Citizens Savings Bank 
pay that the portion of the proceeds that would have otherwise been 
distributed to the unsecured creditors under the agreement to the 
Chapter 7 trustee for distribution to unsecured creditors in 
accordance with the priority scheme under the Bankruptcy Code.258  
The effect of the order was that priority creditors and the insiders 
who would be personally liable for the debtor’s obligation to the IRS 
would benefit, while the general unsecured creditors would be 
                                                          
 252. See id. at 1307-08 (recognizing that liquidation would not satisfy any of the 
creditor’s claims). 
 253. Id. at 1308. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 1309. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 724-726).  Section 726 of the Bankruptcy provides that 
in a Chapter 7 case (as in a Chapter 11 case) certain tax claims have priority over 
general unsecured claims.  11 U.S.C. §§ 724-726 (2000). 
 258. Id. at 1309-10 (“[O]nce the committee was in operation it had to, it’s require 
by law, to act for the benefit of the entire estate.”). 
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deprived of any recovery.259  The district court affirmed, and the 
creditors’ committee appealed.260 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, 
rejecting the argument that the agreement violated the distribution 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.261  The court noted that as a secured 
creditor, Citizens Savings Bank was entitled to receive all proceeds 
from the sale of the debtor’s assets, as such proceeds were not 
sufficient to satisfy its liens in full.262  Further, “no one else had any 
claim of right under the Bankruptcy Code” to Citizens Savings Bank’s 
$5 million distribution.263  Because Citizens Savings Bank was entitled 
to receive all such proceeds, it was free to do as it pleased with such 
recoveries, including to distribute them to general unsecured 
creditors.  In oft-quoted language, the court noted:  “While the debtor 
and the trustee are not allowed to pay nonpriority creditors ahead of priority 
creditors, creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish with the 
bankruptcy dividends they receive, including to share them with other 
creditors.”264  Further, “[t]here is nothing in the Code forbidding 
Citizens to have voluntarily paid part of these monies to some or all 
of the general, unsecured creditors after the bankruptcy proceedings 
finished.”265 
Critical to the court’s reasoning was that once the net proceeds 
were properly distributed to Citizens Savings Bank on account of its 
secured claim, the proceeds were no longer property of the estate.266  
Moreover, the “sharing between Citizens and the general, unsecured 
creditors was to occur after distribution of the estate property, having 
no effect whatever on the bankruptcy distribution to other 
creditors.”267  Until all liens on a debtor’s property are satisfied, the 
distribution scheme under the Bankruptcy Code does not come into 
play.268  Accordingly, the court found that the agreement did not 
distribute the debtor’s property “at the expense of priority 
creditors”269 and upheld the agreement.270 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 1310. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 1313. 
 262. Id. at 1312. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1313 (emphasis added). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 1312. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 1313-14, 1318-19. 
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C.  SPM’s Progeny 
In many respects, the SPM holding could be viewed as limited.  
First, it involved a secured creditor whose entitlement to the proceeds 
at issue was undisputed.  Furthermore, the distribution of proceeds to 
general unsecured creditors occurred outside of a Chapter 11 plan 
and, as the court noted “after distribution of the estate property.”271  
In fact, the initial physical distribution was to be made to the secured 
creditor, and the secured creditor would then make a physical 
distribution to the creditors’ committee.272  Under these 
circumstances, the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code did not 
prevent the secured creditor from transferring value to the general 
unsecured creditors “after the bankruptcy proceedings finished.”273 
Despite the limited holding of SPM, bankruptcy professionals 
pushed the envelope by using some of the broader language of SPM 
to justify actions that would otherwise appear to be forbidden by the 
Bankruptcy Code, at least facially.  Courts have generally obliged.  
Specifically, “creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish 
with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including to share them 
with other creditors,”274 has often been used to justify distributions 
that, on their face, seem to violate either the Absolute Priority Rule 
(by providing juniors with a recovery when an objecting class of 
seniors is not paid in full) or the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition 
(by providing a greater recovery to some creditors over the objection 
of a less fortunate co-equal class).  The SPM doctrine of “gifting” has 
been expanded well beyond the concept that a secured creditor can 
agree to share a portion of its recovery to other creditors after receipt 
of proceeds in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 
1.  Secured creditor carveouts 
The least controversial use of SPM is to permit carveouts of secured 
creditors’ collateral.  A typical carveout is an arrangement under 
which secured creditors permit the use of a portion of their collateral 
to pay administrative costs, such as attorney fees and possible 
subsequent Chapter 7 expenses.275  Carveouts are usually negotiated 
as part of a Debtor-In-Possession (“DIP”) financing or cash collateral 
agreements where, in the event of default on the DIP loan or cash 
                                                          
 271. Id. at 1312. 
 272. Id. at 1309. 
 273. Id. at 1313. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See generally Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted To Know About Carve 
Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002). 
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collateral agreement and resulting administrative insolvency of the 
debtor, the DIP or secured lender agrees to a capped amount of 
money extracted from the collateral (or in some cases added to the 
secured debt) that will be used to pay administrative fees.276  The 
secured creditor’s motivation in providing this kind of protection is 
to add value to the loan, add value to the debtor, and help ensure a 
smooth administration of the estate.  The theory is that certain 
administrative creditors, especially professionals, would be unwilling 
to provide services to a potentially administratively insolvent debtor.  
The secured creditor with a lien on all the debtor’s assets is willing to 
agree to the carve out because it believes that the value of the 
debtor’s assets, and therefore its secured claim, will be increased by 
the services provided by certain administrative creditors.277 
In In re Nuclear Imaging Systems, Inc.,278 the court held that a secured 
creditor may agree to a carveout from its secured claim to pay certain 
administrative creditors of its choosing, without having to give the 
proceeds to a Chapter 7 trustee to distribute in accordance the 
Chapter 7 priority scheme.279  Specifically, pursuant to a court-
approved cash collateral stipulation, the secured creditor agreed to a 
carveout of $125,000 from its secured claim for postpetition 
professionals’ fees of the debtor’s attorneys.280  The debtor’s counsel 
had possession of the $125,000 and requested approval of such 
amounts in a fee application.281  Another administrative creditor 
objected, arguing that such amounts must instead be distributed to 
the Chapter 7 trustee to distribute pro rata to all administrative 
expense claimants.282  The court overruled the objection and, citing 
SPM, held that a secured creditor is free to contract with any creditor 
to pay such creditor from proceeds of the secured creditor’s 
collateral.283  The court explained that nothing in the Bankruptcy 
Code requires that “proceeds—which would otherwise be payable 
solely to the secured creditor but for its consent to transfer property 
to a particular administrative claimant—must be paid to the trustee as 
                                                          
 276. See id. at 445-46. 
 277. See id. (“[T]he carve out . . . may benefit the secured creditor, which might 
have concluded that an orderly liquidation or restructuring process is likely to result 
in the highest net recovery on its claim, even after payment of care out expenses.”). 
 278. 270 B.R. 365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 279. Id. at 371-73. 
 280. Id. at 369. 
 281. Id. at 370. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 379-81. 
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estate property.”284  The court explicitly stated that the secured 
creditor’s claim was not estate property. 285 
2.  Gifting to junior classes under a plan 
The case of In re MCorp. Financial, Inc.286 expanded SPM even 
further, permitting gifting (1) by an unsecured creditor, (2) directly 
from the debtor’s estate (as opposed to directly from the gifting 
creditor), and (3) under a Chapter 11 plan (where the Absolute 
Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition are 
applicable).287  In MCorp., senior unsecured bondholders negotiated a 
Chapter 11 plan of liquidation with the debtors and the creditors’ 
committee, whereby the senior bondholders agreed to accept less 
than the full amount of their claims, while providing a nominal 
recovery to junior bondholders and a recovery to the FDIC, the latter 
being in settlement of prepetition litigation.288  The senior 
bondholders agreed to pay the FDIC despite that they were not being 
paid in full, because they decided they would be better off settling 
with the FDIC and receiving an earlier recovery than spending years 
litigating with the FDIC.289 
The junior bondholders rejected the plan and argued that it 
violated the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions (the Absolute 
Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition),290 because 
the FDIC, which was arguably junior in priority to the junior 
bondholders, was receiving a recovery before the junior bondholders 
were paid in full.291  The court rejected the junior bondholders’ 
arguments, and, citing SPM, held that the recovery to the FDIC was 
proper because it was being paid by the senior bondholders out of 
their higher priority distribution.292  The court appeared to adopt a 
                                                          
 284. Id. at 379. 
 285. Id. at 380; see In re White Glove, Inc., 1998 WL 731611, *7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1998) (citing SPM to support holding that a secured creditor in Chapter 7 is 
permitted to carve out a portion of the proceeds of its collateral to pay some 
administrative creditors of its choosing). 
 286. 160 B.R. 941 (S.D. Tex 1993). 
 287. See id. 
 288. Id. at 948. 
 289. Id. 
 290. They actually appear to have confused the two provisions, but the result is the 
same.  See id. at 960 (using the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition in conjunction with 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which describes the conditions a plan must meet to be 
fair and equitable with respect to a class of unsecured claims, to determine that the 
plans pass the statutory test). 
 291. See id. (detailing the juniors’ argument that the requirement in the Code that 
a plan does not discriminate unfairly means that the junior bondholders, by statute, 
should get paid before the FDIC). 
 292. See id. (determining that as long as the juniors receive as much as they are 
supposed if the seniors did not share their higher priority share then the regulation 
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general rule that a senior class of unsecured creditors may share its 
distribution under a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan with a junior class of 
creditors, as long as the classes between the two receive “at least as 
much as what they would without the sharing.”293  The court similarly 
implied that unfair discrimination is not implicated when a senior 
class of creditors chooses to share its distribution with one junior class 
of creditors while not sharing anything with another class of creditors 
of equal priority to the junior class of creditors.294 
The court explicitly stated that the fact that the senior creditor in 
SPM was secured was “not relevant;” rather, “it was the creditor’s 
status as prior to the IRS that allowed it to share with those under the 
IRS, just as the seniors’ priority over the juniors allows them to fund 
the FDIC settlement.”295  In addition, implicit in the Mcorp. court’s 
ruling were:  (1) the fact that the distribution in SPM was outside a 
plan was not relevant; and (2) the fact that the distribution to 
unsecured creditors in SPM was to be paid directly from the senior 
creditor to the junior creditor, as opposed to from the debtor’s 
estate, was not relevant.296 
3.  Gifting to equity under a plan 
The SPM doctrine was further expanded in In re Genesis Health 
Ventures, Inc.297 to condone a distribution to equity holders, “gifted” by 
senior secured lenders, while creditors were not being paid in full.298  
In Genesis, the debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization included a 
distribution under a new management incentive plan to certain 
directors and officers, who were prepetition equity holders, which 
included stock, loan forgiveness, waivers, releases, exculpation, and 
other value.299  The court held that the Absolute Priority Rule was not 
violated by this distribution under the New Management Incentive 
Plan even though creditors were not being paid in full, because the 
distribution “represents an allocation of the enterprise value 
                                                          
is not violated). 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. (noting that all equity is treated alike under the plan where the claims 
are paid before equity is paid). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See id. (indicating the only relevant factor in the SPM opinion in evaluating 
the junior bondholders’ claim is that the secured creditor could share its proceeds 
with a creditor of a lower priority than the IRS). 
 297. In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 298. See id. at 617-18 (allowing Senior Lenders to determine how to allocate their 
value without violating the fair and equitable requirement of the Code). 
 299. See id. at 617 (describing the New Management Incentive Plan which 
provided benefits among forty-three management employees whose benefits were 
derived from value that would have gone to the Senior Lenders). 
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otherwise distributable to the Senior [secured] Lenders, which the 
Senior Lenders have agreed to offer to [management] . . . .  The 
Senior Lenders are free to allocate such value without violating the 
‘fair and equitable’ requirement.”300 
4.  Gifting to select unsecured classes under a plan 
a. Cases approving selective gifting 
Courts have similarly applied SPM’s gifting doctrine to approve 
distributions under Chapter 11 plans that would otherwise violate the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.  Specifically, in In re Parke Imperial 
Canton, Ltd.,301 the court held that the secured creditors’ allocation of 
a portion of their distribution from the plan of reorganization to one 
class of unsecured creditors but not another class of unsecured 
creditors does not constitute unfair discrimination under § 1129(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.302  In that case, the secured creditors 
proposed a plan that divided the unsecured creditors into two 
Classes—13 and 14.303  Although both classes would share pro rata in 
                                                          
 300. Id. at 618.  The District Court for the Southern District of New York also 
recently held that the Absolute Priority Rule is not implicated when a senior 
(secured) creditor shares its distribution.  Specifically, the court in Motorola, Inc. v. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC) held that a secured 
creditor’s agreement to fund a litigation trust to pursue litigation against a particular 
unsecured creditor and share the proceeds of the litigation trust with the debtor’s 
estate does not violate the Absolute Priority Rule.  No. 01Civ.5429(GBD), 2005 WL 
756900, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2005).  In Iridium, the statutory committee of 
unsecured creditors and the agent for the debtor’s senior secured lenders entered 
into a settlement agreement whereby the creditors’ committee agreed not to contest 
the validity of the lenders’ liens and the lenders agreed that the estates could use $47 
million that they would have otherwise received on account of their secured claims to 
fund a litigation trust to sue Motorola, an administrative creditor.  Id. at *2.  The 
settlement agreement further provided that the proceeds of the litigation trust would 
be shared in a specified manner between the lenders and the debtor’s estates.  Id.  
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement, and Motorola appealed, 
arguing that the $47 million used to fund a litigation trust to pursue litigation against 
Motorola is an improper distribution of estate moneys.  Id. at *3-5.  The district court 
rejected Motorola’s argument, holding that, under SPM, the $47 million used to 
fund the litigation trust belonged to the lender and was not estate money; therefore, 
the priority scheme for distribution of estate assets under the Bankruptcy Code was 
not implicated.  Id. at *7.  In dicta, the court stated that SPM cannot be used to 
violate the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, but rested its holding on the fact that 
the $47 million was not estate money:  “On these facts, the priority scheme for the 
distribution of estate assets under the Bankruptcy Code is not implicated, let alone 
violated.”  Id. 
 301. In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., No. 93-61004, 1994 WL 842777 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 1994). 
 302. See id. at *11 (noting that the “cramdown” requirements of the Bankruptcy 
Code applied in this plan because several classes were impaired under the plan, and 
therefore the plan could not discriminate unfairly). 
 303. See id. at *2 (outlining all of the classes of the plan including Class 13, a class 
of unsecured claims that most of the other 12 classes paid into, and Class 14 which 
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the remaining proceeds after compensation of the secured claims, 
the secured creditors agreed to contribute up to $10,000 to 
guarantee that Class 13, but not Class 14, would receive at least a ten 
percent recovery.304  The court cited SPM in rejecting an argument 
that this additional recovery to only one of two equal priority classes 
violated the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.305 
The WorldCom Court took SPM further than any other court up to 
that point, by finding that by voting to accept a plan of 
reorganization, a class of claims can be “deemed” to have “gifted” a 
portion of its recovery to another class of creditors, and that the 
additional recovery received by the recipients is not subject to attack 
as unfair discrimination or, presumably, as violative of the Absolute 
Priority Rule.306  In WorldCom, an Ad Hoc Committee of Trade 
Creditors, consisting of some but not all trade creditors of the 
substantively consolidated debtors, objected to the plan of 
reorganization as originally filed.307  To settle the objection, 
representatives of classes consisting of certain senior and 
subordinated bond claims agreed that their classes would forgo a 
portion of the plan consideration allocated to them and would 
provide such consideration to the members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Trade Creditors.308 
The debtors thereafter amended the plan to provide that 
acceptances of the plan by the classes of bond claims would constitute 
an agreement by all holders of claims in such classes to distribute a 
portion of their recovery to members of the ad hoc trade 
committee.309  The debtors solicited the votes of the classes of bond 
claims again, which were to receive a lower recovery as a result of the 
agreement made by certain bondholders, representatives on their 
                                                          
was the other unsecured claim class). 
 304. Id. 
 305. See id. at *11 (taking note that the 10 percent guarantee will not be paid from 
the estate, so SPM controls because Classes 13 and 14 are sharing equally in the 
distribution of proceeds). 
 306. See In re WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 23861928, at *60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(reasoning that the discrimination among the classes in the reorganization plan is 
not unfair because it is “appropriate, reasonably proportional to the issues of the case 
and necessary to the reorganization”). 
 307. See id. at *14 (noting that the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee was not the 
only objecting party, the Ad Hoc Committee of Dissenting Bondholders, Platinum 
Fund, a German back, and HSBC all objected to the original plan as well). 
 308. See id. at *14-15 (arguing a that it relied on pre-merger trade claims, the Ad 
Hoc Trade Claims Committee settled its objections by treating debt claims by 
reducing the recovery of the holders of those claims). 
 309. See id. (classifying these claims as MCI Pre-merger claims to allow for 
additional recoveries by the classes that had reliance claims). 
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behalf, and both such classes overwhelmingly voted to accept the 
plan.310 
Upon request of the court, the debtors deemed the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Trade Creditors to be a separate class from the 
debtors’ other trade creditors and deemed the class of other trade 
creditors to reject the plan.311  As a result, the debtors pursued 
confirmation of the plan under the cramdown provisions of 
§ 1129(b).312 
The court then confirmed the plan, holding that it satisfied 
§ 1129(b)(2) with respect to the deemed rejecting class.313  Citing 
SPM, the court held that the enhanced recovery for the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Trade Creditors did not constitute “unfair 
discrimination” in violation of the Bankruptcy Code, 
because the Contributions are the result of other creditors . . . 
voluntarily sharing their recovery under the Plan with the members 
of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims Committee . . . .  The greater 
value received by the members of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims 
Committee is not the result of the Debtors’ distribution of estate 
                                                          
 310. See id. at *75-76 (describing the voting procedures that allowed the senior 
debtors to reconsider their vote since they were going to get less recovery because of 
the compromise to allow for recovery to the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee to 
come from holders of debt claims). 
 311. See id. at *18-19 (determining that separating Class 6 into Class 6A [MCI Pre-
Merger Claims] and 6B [Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee] made the voting 
procedures fairer because although the two groups recovered the same, the Ad Hoc 
Trade Claims Committee could potentially have undue influence over the rest of the 
class).  Although facially, it would appear that some members of a class receiving a 
greater recovery under a plan than other members of the class would violate section 
1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court held that the Ad Hoc Committee 
members were receiving the same treatment as the trade creditors under the plan.  
Id. at *17-18.  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000) (“a plan shall . . . provide 
the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder 
of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular 
claim or interest.”).  “Any enhanced value received by holders of [claims in the class 
of members of the Ad Hoc committee] on account of contributions from other 
Classes is not a treatment of these Claims under the plan and does not constitute 
unfair discrimination.”  WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *60.  It appears that 
because the additional recovery to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee was 
coming through a “contribution” from other classes, the court did not consider it to 
be a distribution to such creditors for treatment purposes.  Id.  In fact, although 
separate classification of the Ad Hoc Trade Committee would generally have raised 
concerns under section 1122, the court simply ignored these by finding that the 
claims of the Ad Hoc Committee members “are separately classified for voting 
purposes and not for treatment purposes.”  Id. 
 312. See id. at *45 (noting that the cramdown mechanism allows the debtors to 
recognize the discrimination arguments of different classes, but still allows for the 
plan to go through because there is a reasonable basis for disparate treatment). 
 313. See id. at *60 (ruling that the discrimination among the various classes of 
unsecured claims is not unfair discrimination because there is a reasonable basis for 
the discrimination between the classes and the discrimination is needed to execute 
the reorganization plan). 
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property to such creditors.  Creditors are generally free to do 
whatever they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, 
including sharing them with other creditors, so long as recoveries 
received under the Plan by other creditors are not impacted.314 
The court noted that the contributions were “not coming from or 
diminishing the estate, but rather, [were] coming from and 
diminishing the previously accepted recovery of the holders of 
[senior and subordinated bond claims].”315  Moreover, “[i]f the 
Contributions were not made, the amounts represented thereby 
would not inure to the benefit of any [claims in the class deemed to 
reject], but rather would be paid under the Plan and remain available 
to the Classes contributing the respective amounts.”316 
The court also held that the plan of reorganization did not violate 
the Absolute Priority Rule because no class of claims or equity 
interests junior to the deemed rejected class was receiving any 
property of the debtor under the plan.317  The court noted that the 
“absolute priority rule is inapplicable to contributions of Plan 
recoveries made by certain creditors to other creditors.  Agreements 
by creditors to share their recoveries under a plan of reorganization 
with other creditors need not benefit an entire class.  Moreover, the 
contributing creditor need not be a secured creditor.”318 
Although WorldCom and the court were insistent that the 
additional recovery to the members of the Ad Hoc Trade Claims 
Committee was not estate property, and that they were getting the 
same “treatment” as other trade creditors, the use of the plan process 
to achieve this “gifting” for the benefit of some trade creditors, but 
not others, makes WorldCom different from other cases.319  First, the 
agreement by the bondholders to contribute consideration to the 
                                                          
 314. Id. at *61 (citing In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993)) 
(other citations omitted). 
 315. Id. at *24. 
 316. Id. at *25. 
 317. See id. at *61 (citing SPM for the proposition that creditors are free to do 
what they want with the proceeds as long as it does not diminish the recovery of 
other creditors, and the increased recovery for the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee 
is not the result of distribution of estate property). 
 318. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 319. See id. (recognizing that the contribution is not coming from the estate, but 
rather the recovery of the holders of the Senior Debt Claims, and citing to SPM to 
support the proposition that the distribution to the Ad Hoc Trade Committee is not 
a distribution of estate property but rather a distribution of the creditors’ own 
bankruptcy dividends).  But see In re Snyders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 894 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (rejecting the argument from a secured creditor that a 
plan to distribute assets to one class of unsecured creditors and not another was not a 
distribution of the estate because the distribution specifically includes assets that are 
part of litigation claims of the secured creditors against the debtors). 
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trade committee was a “deemed” contribution, achievable only 
through the plan process.320  Unlike other cases where the creditors 
making the contribution explicitly agreed to do so, in WorldCom, 
certain large members of the classes agreed that the entire class 
would make the contribution, and by voting to accept the plan, the 
class was “deemed” to have agreed to make the contribution.321  
Although the class overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan, it did 
not do so unanimously.  Thus, unlike in any other case expanding 
SPM, a creditor that did not want to make the distribution was forced 
to do so.322  Moreover, unlike those other cases where the “gift” could 
have at least happened outside the plan context, in WorldCom, the gift 
was dependent on the plan solicitation process and plan voting 
guidelines. 
In addition, the WorldCom Chapter 11 plan made the distinction 
between the creditors receiving the distribution (i.e., the noisy 
objectors) and those that did not (i.e., the dispersed smaller 
creditors).  It classified them separately, and although the plan 
distribution section was careful to provide them with the same 
recovery, at least facially, the rest of the plan ensured that they were 
actually “treated” differently.  Specifically, §§ .07 and 4.09 of the plan 
provided that holders in the trade committee class and holders of 
other general unsecured claims would each receive “(i) 7.14 shares of 
New Common Stock for each one thousand ($1,000) dollars of such 
holder’s [allowed claim] and (ii) Cash in an amount equal to .1785 
multiplied by the Allowed amount of such [claim].”323 
                                                          
 320. See Worldcom, 2003 WL 2386198, at *24 (describing the plan process after the 
Senior Debt Claims holders voted to approve a contribution to the Ad Hoc Trade 
Claims Committee which included having all of the other classes reconsider their 
vote because all impaired classes have to vote on a plan that would discriminate 
against one class). 
 321. See id. at *49 (outlining the voting process where members of voting classes 
received a supplement of information regarding the treatment of the various 
unsecured claims, including the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee, and determining 
that the supplement supplied adequate information for all voting members to decide 
whether to accept or reject the plan including the contribution). 
 322. For example, a creditor might believe that it is unfair to provide extra 
consideration to certain large creditors in a class, simply because they are large and 
have the money and ability to hire counsel to stage a noisy, difficult objection.  See id. 
at *17 (describing the voting procedures where more than one-half in number of 
claims voted in favor of the settlement, leaving some claims not in favor of the 
settlement). 
 323. WorldCom Plan, October 21, 2003 (the “WorldCom Plan”), §§ 4.07, 4.09.  
Section 4.08 of the WorldCom Plan concerned the treatment of another class of 
general unsecured claims—the “MCI Pre-Merger Claims,” whose recovery was also 
heavily disputed and resolved by settlement.  The treatment of that class is irrelevant 
for this analysis. 
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The additional recovery to holders of the trade committee claims 
was achieved through a different means.  The “treatment” section for 
classes deemed to contribute provided for a recovery but added: 
provided, however, that the acceptance of the Plan by [the class] 
shall constitute an agreement by the holders of [allowed claims in 
the class] to contribute to the members of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade 
Claims Committee on a pro rata basis New Notes in an aggregate 
principal amount of $[X] out of the aggregate distribution 
provided to the holders of [allowed claims in the class], which 
contributions shall be distributed as set forth in Section 6.06 of the 
Plan.324 
Section 6.12 of the WorldCom Plan further suggested that the 
distribution was being made under the plan:  “The distributions of 
the contributions to the members of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims 
Committee, pursuant to sections 4.12 and 4.13 of the Plan shall be 
distributed by the Disbursing Agent in the manner, and in such 
amounts, as determined by the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims 
Committee.”325 
When a secured creditor “gifts” a recovery that would concededly 
go to such creditor, it might be fair to say that the recovery should 
not be considered “estate property.”326  In WorldCom, in contrast, the 
recovery “gifted” by the bondholders was not necessarily a recovery 
the debtors were required to give to them.  Rather, the recovery 
consisted of property of the debtors remaining after paying all 
secured claims.327  The debtors could have divided those proceeds in 
numerous ways among its unsecured classes, not all of which would 
have resulted in the gifting classes receiving those proceeds.  As such, 
these proceeds appear more like estate property than the recoveries 
gifted by secured creditors in the majority of the cases following 
SPM.328 
                                                          
 324. Id. §§ 4.12, 4.13.  The amount of the contribution of New Notes to the 
members of the ad hoc trade committee was $21.2 million in principal amount by 
holders of the MCI senior bonds and $19 million in principal amount by holders of 
the MCI junior bonds.  Id. 
 325. Id. § 6.06. 
 326. In reality, even the property in which a secured creditor has a valid first 
priority lien is property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) (listing an all-embracing definition of property of the 
estate created after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy). 
 327. See WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *22-23 (evaluating the contribution to 
the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee as a reduction in the recovery of the secured 
creditors after the secured creditors were paid in full according to the plan). 
 328. See In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 863-64 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2001) (rejecting a plan that called for a 99% distribution to one class of 
unsecured creditors and a 1% distribution to the other class because it violated the 
Unfair Discrimination Rule, and determining that this distribution of assets from a 
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In addition, arguments may be made that WorldCom took SPM too 
far, because the gift could not have been made outside of the plan.  
Specifically, the MCI bondholders could not have made the 
contribution outside of the plan without unanimous consent of all 
the bondholders.  It was only because of the unique Chapter 11 plan 
provisions allowing a vote of one-half in number and two-thirds in 
amount to force a recovery on a dissenting minority that the deal with 
the objecting trade creditors was able to be accomplished.329  Without 
the benefit of the plan process, perhaps the largest bondholders 
would have agreed to make the distribution to the objecting trade 
committee on their own outside of the plan process.  Similarly, 
without the benefits of SPM, the gift would have had to have been 
made to all trade creditors similarly situated with the Ad Hoc Trade 
committee.330  The combination of the SPM doctrine and the plan 
process enabled the larger parties negotiating to spread the cost of 
resolving the objection among all bondholders, but limit the benefit 
of the contribution to the actual objecting parties. 
While one might argue that this unfairly benefits those creditors 
who have the money and power to file and litigate a difficult 
objection, without the arrangement being sanctioned by the 
bankruptcy court, it is uncertain whether an agreement could have 
been reached at all, as it would undoubtedly have been much more 
expensive, perhaps prohibitively so, to pay all trade creditors the 
“asking price” of the objecting trade creditors.331  It is also very 
important to note that, as is common in the gifting cases, the 
“objecting class,” the trade creditors not on the trade committee, 
fared no worse as a result of the gift.332  As such, it appears that the 
expansive use of SPM was not prejudicial to anyone and was 
beneficial to the plan process and the goal of Chapter 11, which is a 
consensual Chapter 11 plan.  It allowed for creative plan drafting and 
                                                          
lien is part of the estate property). 
 329. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (f) (2000) (deeming an unimpaired class to accept 
the plan in total if one-half in number of creditors and the holders of two-thirds 
amount in claims accept the plan). 
 330. See In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1312 (1st Cir. 1993) (ruling that a 
creditor can distribute it’s own dividends however it wants as long as it does not pay 
nonpriority creditors ahead of priority creditors). 
 331. See WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, *47 (discussing the strong position of the 
Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee because they had “unique reliance claims” that 
differentiated their need for distribution from other unsecured creditors, and 
allowing for an amended plan that put the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee in a 
better position). 
 332. See id. at *5 (describing the plan that divided Class 6 into 6A which were pre-
merger claims and 6B which were the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee claims, but 
elaborating that each member of the two classes would receive the same treatment 
under the plan:  7.14 shares of new stock and a cash payout). 
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negotiations that enabled the parties to avoid a long, costly, and 
protracted confirmation battle and paved the way for a much earlier 
emergence from Chapter 11 for WorldCom than would otherwise 
have been possible.333  This inured to the benefit of all stakeholders 
and the debtor. 
b.  Cases rejecting selective gifting 
Faced with similar facts to those in WorldCom, the court in In re 
Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, Inc.334 came to a different conclusion.335  
Specifically, the Sentry Court held that a secured creditor’s “gifting” a 
distribution under a plan of reorganization to one class but not 
another of equal priority is insufficient to overcome an objection by 
the rejecting class contending that the plan violates the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition.336 
In Sentry, the debtors and the secured creditor jointly proposed a 
plan that paid the class of unsecured trade creditors 100% of their 
claims, while other unsecured creditors would receive only 1% of 
their claims.337  The less favored creditor class rejected the plan and 
creditors in the class objected to the plan on the basis that it 
discriminated unfairly in violation of § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.338  The secured creditor argued that the uneven distributions 
were not “unfair discrimination,” because the secured creditor was 
giving up part of its entitlement in order to pay the trade creditor 
class, and the less favored class would not receive any distribution if 
the secured creditor merely foreclosed on its liens and security 
interests.339 
                                                          
 333. See generally Paul Davidson, WorldCom’s Black Cloud About to Lift, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 19, 2004, at 1B (discussing WorldCom’s “astonishing” emergence out of 
Chapter 11 after being under it for twenty-one months despite the $11 billion 
accounting fraud when the average bankruptcy filing lasts thirty months). 
 334. 264 B.R. 850, 853 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001). 
 335. See id. at 853 (determining that a plan did not draw the classes narrowly 
enough to overcome the statutory requirement of fair and equitable distribution). 
 336. See id. at 864 (ruling that there was no justification for discrimination that 
resulted in a ninety-nine percent pay differential between equally situated classes). 
 337. See id. at 855-56 (noting that most creditors in Class 3 had small claims and 
were mostly national entities and Class 4 included smaller creditors who would only 
get 1 percent of their claims paid out). 
 338. See id. at 859, 863 (discussing the purpose of the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition to ensure equal treatment, but that does not mean that some 
discrimination is impermissible because not all creditors are situated equally all the 
time). 
 339. See id. at 862-64 (detailing the secured creditors’ argument which was 
premised on the fact that they had a lien on all assets, so the disfavored class had no 
legal right to complain about the distribution). 
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The court rejected the argument and held that the plan 
discriminated unfairly.340  The court held that MCorp. was 
distinguishable, because it did not involve payments to a class of 
creditors under a plan; rather it involved a settlement, albeit through 
confirmation of a plan.341  The court further noted that a “secured 
[creditor] cannot simply purchase the assent of an unsecured class by 
giving up part of its claim.”342 
The court reasoned that, although the secured creditor could have 
foreclosed on the collateral and used the proceeds as it wished 
without regard to the requirements of section 1129, the decision to 
use the “powerful equitable tools” in a Chapter 11 reorganization 
results in a price to be paid, namely 
negotiation to win over the acceptance of an impaired class and 
treatment of all non-accepting classes fairly, equitably, and without 
unfair discrimination.  [The secured creditor] proposes to obtain 
the benefit of equitable tools without paying the price.  The statute 
has no provision for that, and the Court is unwilling to read these 
requirements out of the Code.343   
 Important to the court was a view that “[i]n general, the 
Bankruptcy Code is premised on the rule of equality of 
treatment.  Creditors with claims of equal rank are entitled to 
equal distribution.344  The Sentry court would not have likely 
approved the distribution scheme in WorldCom.  Perhaps the 
different result in these two cases can be attributed to the 
possibility that had the court not approved the deal in WorldCom, 
the case might have lingered in litigation over substantive 
consolidation for years, causing serious damage to the debtors, 
                                                          
 340. See id. at 864 (using the “Markell” test to determine that the plan proponents 
did not overcome the presumption of unfair discrimination because the plan seemed 
to pay the class of national creditors for “reasons other than preservation of value” of 
the plan). 
 341. See id. at 863 (further distinguishing Mcorp. by pointing out that the court 
never addressed the priorities between the FDIC and the junior bondholders). 
 342. Id. at 864. 
 343. Id. at 866.  The court appeared to worry about allowing what it viewed to be 
exceptions to the Chapter 11 plan requirements: 
To accept [the secured creditor’s] argument that a secured lender can, 
without any reference to fairness, decide which creditors get paid and how 
much those creditors get paid, is to reject the historical foundation of equity 
receiverships and to read the § 1129(b) requirements out of the Code.  If the 
argument were accepted with respect to § 1129(b) ‘unfair discrimination 
requirement,’ there is no logical reason not to apply it to the § 1129(b) ‘fair 
and equitable’ requirement [i.e., the Absolute Priority Rule], or to the 
§ 1129(a)(10) requirement that at least one class has accepted the plan.  To 
accept that argument is simply to start down a slippery slope that does great 
violence to history and to positive law. 
Id. at 865. 
 344. Id. at 863. 
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their estates, and all parties in interest.  In contrast, in Sentry, the 
court may have believed the plan would have been easily 
confirmed without “unfairly” paying trade creditors or if the 
secured creditor agreed to provide a similar contribution to all 
unsecured creditors. 
Similar to Sentry, but unlike WorldCom, the court in In re Snyders 
Drug Stores, Inc.,345 held that a plan discriminated unfairly against an 
objecting class of unsecured creditors by providing a distribution only 
to other classes of unsecured creditors.346  As part of the plan, the 
secured creditor agreed “to allow some of the money that it 
believe[d] would otherwise be paid on its secured claim to instead be 
set aside and paid to two junior classes of unsecured creditors.”347  As 
a result, the unsecured creditors in Class 10 (generally trade creditors 
with whom the reorganized debtor intended to do business and 
lessors of stores it intended to continue to operate) would receive 
$3.75 million in cash, excess from a reclamation fund, and recoveries 
from preserved litigation claims.348  In contrast, Class 12, which 
consisted of other lessor claims, would receive nothing.349 
The court rejected the proponents’ argument that the distribution 
to the unsecured creditors was not property of the estate, but 
constituted an agreement by the senior secured creditor to share 
some of its recovery with other creditors.350  The court noted first that, 
because the distribution included recoveries from preserved litigation 
claims (presumably not subject to the secured creditor’s liens), the 
distribution is property of the estate and must be made in accordance 
with the Bankruptcy Code.351  The court held that SPM was 
distinguishable because (1) it dealt with property that was not 
property of the estate and (2) it concerned an agreement that “was 
not proposed as part of a plan of reorganization, but was instead in 
the nature of a partial assignment or subordination agreement that 
was not subject to the code’s confirmation requirements.”352  The 
                                                          
 345. 307 B.R. 889 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004). 
 346. See id. at 891 (outlining the objections to the reorganization plan of a drug 
store chain that included an unfair discrimination claim and an Absolute Priority 
Rule violation, and upholding the unfair discrimination claim). 
 347. Id. at 892. 
 348. See id. (explaining that the $3.75 million is a six to seven percent distribution 
of the recovery to the secured creditor, and noting that another class of unsecured 
creditors with reclamation claims will get a twenty-seven percent distribution). 
 349. See id. (recognizing that this class consisted of landlords that had claims 
arising from lease rejections of nonresidential real property and personal property). 
 350. Id. at 894. 
 351. See id. (using 11 U.S.C. § 541 to determine that recoveries from preserved 
litigation claims is by statute part of the estate and therefore must be distributed as 
part of the reorganization plan). 
 352. Id. at 896 n.11. 
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court was not clear about whether it would have allowed the gifting 
had the recoveries to Class 10 been clearly out of funds that would 
otherwise have gone to secured creditors.353  Unlike the WorldCom 
court, the Snyders court appeared to have a fundamental problem 
with the use of an SPM gifting scenario to overcome the Bankruptcy 
Code’s Chapter 11 cramdown confirmation requirements.354  As such, 
like the court in Sentry, it is unlikely that the court in Snyders would 
have approved the WorldCom Plan.  Again, it is possible that the 
court in Snyders believed that under the facts of that case, unlike in 
WorldCom, by rejecting the proposed deal, a new, “more fair” deal 
could easily be reached.355 
5.  Rejection of use of SPM for improper ends 
Other than Sentry and Snyder, the latter of which is not as strong as 
the former,356 courts that have rejected the use of SPM to circumvent 
the confirmation requirements of a Chapter 11 plan have generally 
done so only when faced with particularly nefarious attempts by 
parties to favor certain parties over others rather than an attempt to 
“get a deal done.” 
For example, in In re CGE Shattuk, LLC,357 the court held that a 
secured creditor cannot offer to pay some unsecured creditors to 
reject a plan and force a Chapter 7 conversion to circumvent the 
requirements of confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.358  In CGE, the 
debtor and the secured creditor filed competing Chapter 11 plans.359  
The secured creditor thereafter withdrew its plan and, in an effort to 
obtain rejection of the debtor’s plan, offered to give certain creditors 
                                                          
 353. See id. at 895 (focusing the analysis of Class 10 on the fact that it included 
lessors just like Class 12, and there was no reasonable basis for the discrimination 
between the lessors in Class 10 and the lessors in Class 12 because the Class was not 
narrowly tailored to the goals of the plan). 
 354. See id. at 894-96 (relying on a four-factor test to determine whether the 
discrimination was unfair instead of relying on SPM:  (1) is there a reasonable basis 
for the discrimination, (2) whether the plan can be achieved without the 
discrimination, (3) whether the discrimination is in good faith, and (4) how the 
discriminated class is treated). 
 355. See id. at 895-96 (noting that under the current plan the discriminated class 
has no meaningful opportunity for recovery because it does not get any distribution, 
and that the plan can be confirmed without the discrimination). 
 356. One could limit Sentry to its facts because of the court’s expressed concern 
that the recovery being “gifted” did not actually belong to (i.e., was not subject to the 
lien of) the secured creditor. 
 357. 254 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000). 
 358. See id. at 13 (denying the plan of the debtor and secured creditor to pay 
portions of the recovery because the disclosure was an attempt to subvert the 
Chapter 11 provisions). 
 359. See id. at 7 (explaining that the secured creditor filed a second plan because it 
felt that the debtor’s plan would not be confirmed by all creditors, and the secured 
creditor wanted to maximize the value of the debtor’s assets). 
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a payment if, by a certain date, the secured creditor was either 
granted relief from the stay or the case was converted to Chapter 7.360  
Patently, the secured creditor was seeking to buy the support of such 
creditors to block the reorganization efforts of the debtor.361 
Citing SPM, the secured creditor, “NCC,” argued that it should be 
permitted to pay anyone it wished out of the proceeds of its 
collateral.362  The bankruptcy court rejected this argument and held 
that SPM was distinguishable because it involved a formally executed 
agreement between a secured creditor and the creditors’ committee 
that specifically called for the parties to work toward negotiating a 
plan of reorganization and to work cooperatively to maximize the 
value of the debtor’s estate as well as assure a return to general 
unsecured creditors.363 
The court noted that, while the secured creditor’s commitment was 
somewhat similar to a Chapter 11 plan, it was an attempt to avoid the 
requirements of Chapter 11 associated with plan proposal and 
confirmation, including:  (1) classification of claims (11 U.S.C. 
§ 1122), (2) equality of treatment of members of the same class (11 
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4)), and (3) confirmation standards (11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129).364  “In effect, by withdrawing the NCC amended plan, and 
making minor changes to the NCC Commitment [to make a 
distribution to certain creditors], NCC seeks to obtain for itself the 
economic benefits of the withdrawn plan without complying with the 
requirements for confirming a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.”365  
The court noted specifically that the distribution scheme enacted by 
the secured creditor’s proposal would permit different treatment of 
creditors in the same class in violation of section 1123(a)(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.366  Accordingly, “[e]ven assuming that the 
                                                          
 360. See id. at 8-9 (recognizing that the secured creditor withdrew its propose plan 
but filed a commitment to pay fifty percent of the claims to certain creditors if they 
were granted the stay or the case was converted to Chapter 7). 
 361. See id. at 9 (taking note that the amended commitment to pay the fifty 
percent dividend was a clear inducement for the unsecured creditors to reject the 
debtor’s plan in favor of the fifty percent dividend). 
 362. See id. at 10 (disregarding the label the secured creditor put on its proposal 
(a plan to pay collateral), and stating that the substance of a proposal determines 
whether the proposal is a distribution of collateral or a reorganization plan). 
 363. See id. at 10-11 (noting that, in the current case, there was no formal 
agreement and no commitment to generate a joint plan). 
 364. See id. at 10 (defining a plan of reorganization as a plan that is an offer by a 
party in interest to make a distribution to creditors and subject to confirmation by 
the creditors and then approval by the bankruptcy plan, and noting that the secured 
creditor’s commitment is a plan that is an offer of a party in interest to make a 
distribution but it is not subject to the requirements of a plan of reorganization 
under Chapter 11). 
 365. Id. at 13. 
 366. See id. at 11 (elaborating that the commitment is a reorganization plan 
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differences between the facts of SPM and this case are not pertinent, 
the decision in SPM is not authority for the proposition that parties in 
a bankruptcy proceeding may avoid the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code by private agreement.”367 
Similarly, the court in In re Goffena368 refused to uphold an 
agreement between a secured creditor and a Chapter 7 trustee under 
which the secured creditor would allocate and pay the Chapter 7 
trustee’s fees from the collateral proceeds while other administrative 
and priority claimants would not be satisfied.369  The court held that 
SPM was inapposite, because unlike SPM, despite making the 
payment from the bank’s collateral, the property in Goffena remained 
property of the estate.370  The bankruptcy court reasoned that the 
secured creditor had withdrawn its motion for stay relief and, 
therefore, the encumbered property constituted property of the 
estate.371  Accordingly, the proceeds thereof “came into the 
bankruptcy estate to be distributed according to the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, including Sections 506(c) and 726.”372  The court 
also held that the purportedly gifted amount to the Chapter 7 trustee 
was not an assignment or subordination of the secured creditor’s sale 
proceeds to a creditor, but was a payment to the “estate to facilitate its 
interests in a quick sale at a favorable market price.”373  The court 
concluded that “[h]aving so rewarded the estate (and not the Trustee 
individually, for the Trustee is a fiduciary for the estate), the sum 
                                                          
because the economic substance of the plan effectuates the same result as a Chapter 
11 plan while directly subverting the requirements of Chapter 11, and refusing to 
permit a plan that is clearly against statutory requirements and controlling case law). 
 367. Id. 
 368. 175 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994). 
 369. See id. at 389-92 (allowing the secured creditor and the trustee to agree to an 
assignment of sales proceeds, as long as the agreement was not contrary to the 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code like the current requirement). 
 370. See id. at 391 (further distinguishing SPM by noting that the Chapter 7 trustee 
is not a creditor of the estate unlike the unsecured creditors in SPM who were 
creditors of the estate of the debtor, and noting that SPM does not even involve a 
determination of the priorities of estate property under the Bankruptcy Code). 
 371. See id. (realizing that once the motion for stay relief was abandoned, the 
property remained the bank’s collateral, which is part of the estate according to the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 372. Id.  Section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the priority of distributions 
in a case under Chapter 7.  It provides that property of the estate is to be distributed 
first to holders of claims in the priority specified in section 507 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2000).  The Goffena court also seemed bothered by the 
agreement’s attempting to set the Chapter 7 trustee’s fees in circumvention of 
section 326 of the Bankruptcy Code which provides for the fees to be paid to 
trustees.  175 B.R. at 391. 
 373. Id. at 392. 
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allocated for the Trustee’s fee is property of the bankruptcy estate to 
be distributed pursuant to § 726.”374 
The bankruptcy court in In re Scott Cable Communications, Inc.375 
similarly rejected an attempted use of SPM to overcome the 
requirements of Chapter 11.  In that case the plan proposed to avoid 
paying taxing claims in violation of § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.376  The plan of liquidation of Scott Cable contemplated that the 
debtor’s assets would be sold pursuant to the plan of liquidation but 
after confirmation.377  The plan provided that all administrative, 
priority, and general unsecured creditors would be paid from the 
recoveries otherwise distributable to the subordinated secured 
creditors.378  However, the plan was structured to avoid the payment 
of capital gains taxes attributable to the sale.379  The debtor argued 
that those taxes did not have to be paid under the plan, because the 
sale would occur after confirmation.380 
The IRS objected to the plan.  It argued, inter alia, that the plan 
violated § 1129(a)(9) and encompassed a tax avoidance scheme 
proscribed by § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.381  The debtor 
argued that SPM supported the subordinated secured creditors’ right 
to pay other unsecured creditors from their distribution without 
paying the IRS.382  The court rejected the argument, noting that 
“SPM[, a Chapter 7 liquidation,] is inapplicable because Chapter 7 
does not require a plan and, therefore, is not subject to the 
confirmation requirements of § 1129.”383  The court concluded that, 
on the facts before it, the principal purpose of the plan was avoidance 
                                                          
 374. Id.  The holding in Goffena could, however, be limited to its facts, as the court 
appeared to have real concerns about the fact that the Chapter 7 trustee, while 
securing payment of its own fees, failed to send notice to the taxing authorities about 
the sale of collateral, which contained the agreement to pay the trustee’s fees.  See id. 
at 389-90. 
 375. 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). 
 376. Id. at 601, 603. 
 377. Id. at 598. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 599.  The plan also provided that the subordinated secured creditors 
and others would receive releases, including releases from any tax liability to the IRS.  
Id. 
 380. Id.  
 381. Id.; cf. id. at 603 (“Section 1129(d) provides[that n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of this section, on request of a party in interest that is a governmental unit, 
the court may not confirm a plan if the principal purpose of the plan is the 
avoidance of taxes. . . .”). 
 382. See id. at 603 (explaining that the debtor tried to justify its nonpayment to the 
IRS on the authority of SPM). 
 383. Id. 
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of tax liability, in violation of § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.384  
Accordingly, it denied confirmation.385 
IV.  ARMSTRONG:  THE PLAN, THE DECISION, AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
Against the backdrop of the foregoing cases, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Armstrong was asked to decide, in the context of a 
heavily litigated confirmation battle, whether the SPM doctrine could 
be stretched to its extreme, but logical, limits:  permitting the 
deemed gifting from one class of unsecured creditors to equity 
through a plan of reorganization over the objection of another class 
of unsecured creditors.386  The Armstrong court was unwilling to go 
that far.  It not only held that the gifting iteration in the debtor’s plan 
violated the Absolute Priority Rule, but upheld the district court’s 
decision, which suggested that lesser iterations were also 
impermissible, despite decisions by other courts.387 
A. The Armstrong Plan 
Armstrong World Industries Inc. (“Armstrong”) and its subsidiaries 
design, manufacture, and sell flooring products, kitchen and 
bathroom cabinets, and ceiling systems around the world.388  
Armstrong commenced its Chapter 11 case in 2000 after being 
bombarded with asbestos-related personal injury and wrongful death 
claims.389  The United States Trustee appointed three separate 
creditors’ committees pursuant to § 1102(a) of the Bankruptcy Code:  
the official or statutory committee of unsecured creditors (the 
“Unsecured Creditors”), the official committee of asbestos personal 
injury claimants (the “Asbestos PI Claimants”), and the official 
committee of asbestos property damage claimants.390  The asbestos 
                                                          
 384. Id. at 604.  Scott Cable can likely be limited to its facts because court held that 
if the sale of the collateral were to occur outside of bankruptcy, or before plan 
confirmation, or in the plan itself, the tax liability resulting would be so substantial as 
to deny any recovery to the subordinated secured creditors.  Id. at 603.  As such, the 
subordinated secured creditors were not actually entitled to the recovery being 
provided to them under the plan and which they sought to use to pay other 
creditors. 
 385. Id.  
 386. See generally In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
 387. See infra Part IV.B (describing the district court and court of appeal’s 
decision). 
 388. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 509. 
 389. Id.; Brief of Appellant Armstrong World Indus., Inc. at 7, In re Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 05-1881)). 
 390. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.(Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 525 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2005). 
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property damage claimants committee was disbanded during the 
Chapter 11 case.391 
After extended negotiation, Armstrong reached an agreement with 
its committees on the terms of a plan of reorganization and filed its 
Fourth Amended Plan of Reorganization (the “Armstrong Plan”).392  
The Armstrong Plan included the following classes and projected 
recoveries, among others:  Class 6—Unsecured Creditors 
(approximate 59.5% recovery), Class 7—Asbestos PI [Personal 
Injury] Claimants (approximate 20% recovery), Class 12—Equity 
Interest Holder (New Warrants valued at approximately $35 million 
to $40 million).393  The only equity interest holder of Armstrong is 
Armstrong’s parent company, Armstrong Worldwide, Inc., which is, 
in turn, wholly owned by Armstrong Holdings, Inc.394  If the 
Armstrong Plan would be confirmed and consummated, the New 
Warrants ultimately would be distributed to the public shareholders 
of Armstrong Holdings, Inc. 
Recognizing that a recovery to the equity holder would violate the 
Absolute Priority Rule unless all classes of creditors voted to accept 
the Armstrong Plan, the plan provided for a contingent alternative if 
Class 6 rejected it.  If Class 6 voted to reject the Armstrong Plan, the 
New Warrants would be distributed to the holders of Class 7 claims, 
who would then be deemed, by virtue of voting to accept the 
Armstrong Plan, to have waived the right to receive the New Warrants 
and to agree to contribute such warrants to the equity holder.395 
Specifically, § 3.2(1) of the Armstrong Plan provided: 
On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, Reorganized 
AWI shall issue the New Warrants in respect of the Equity Interests 
in AWI as provided in section 7.24 hereof; provided, however, that, if 
Class 6 votes to reject the Plan, no distribution shall be made under 
the Plan from AWI’s estate in respect of the Equity Interests in AWI 
but, in such event, Reorganized AWI shall issue the New Warrants 
as provided in section 7.24 hereof in respect of the Asbestos 
Personal Injury Claims and in accordance with section 10.1(b) 
hereof.396 
Further, § 10.1(b) of the Armstrong Plan provided 
In addition, if Class 6 has voted to reject the Plan, the New 
Warrants shall be issued by Reorganized AWI on account of the 
                                                          
 391. Id. at 525 n.4. 
 392. Id. at 525. 
 393. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 526 n.7. 
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Asbestors Personal Injury Claims; however, such claimants have 
waived on behalf of themselves and the Asbestos PI Trust any right 
to the New Warrants.  The New Warrants shall be issued by 
Reorganized AWI to AWWD (or to Holdings as the successor to 
AWWD under the Holdings Plan of Liquidation), consistent with 
section 7.24 hereof (and shall never be issued or delivered to the 
Asbestors PI Trust), without any action being required of, or any 
direction by, the Asbestos PI Trust or the Asbestos PI Trustees in 
such regard.397 
Although the Unsecured Creditors had negotiated and supported 
the Armstrong Plan, it could not bind the individual unsecured 
creditors.398  In addition, the committee began to have reservations 
about the advantages of the Armstrong Plan to Unsecured Creditors 
as the voting deadline approached.399  The reason for the Unsecured 
Creditors’ change in course was that the Senate Judiciary Committee 
had approved legislation, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution 
Act (the “FAIR Act”),400 and the Committee believed that the FAIR 
Act might be enacted in the very near future.  If that occurred, 
Armstrong’s liability for asbestos injury claimants would be reduced 
making more money available for unsecured creditors.401  As a result, 
the parties obtained an extension of the voting deadline.402  However, 
                                                          
 397. Id. at 526 n.8. 
 398. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509 (explaining that, because 
the plan would issue the new warrants to AWI’s equity interest holders without fully 
satisfying the claims of the unsecured creditors, all “impaired” unsecured creditors 
were required to approve the plan under section 1129(a)(8)). 
 399. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 527. 
 400. Id. at 527-28. 
 401. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510.  Specifically, the FAIR Act 
would provide an 
exclusive administrative forum for addressing asbestos claims . . . [and] 
would create a no-fault, administrative compensation system for asbestos 
claims that would replace civil litigation in the state and federal courts.  A 
claims process under the supervision of the United States Court of Federal 
Claims would determine eligibility for compensation, and eligible claimants 
would be paid from a Fund financed by contributions from insurers and 
from defendant companies. 
In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 527-28 (quoting Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos 
Litigation in the 21st Century/Asbestos Legislation:  Federal and State, SJ031 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
549, 556 (2003)).  It appears that the creditors’ committee believed that Armstrong’s 
contribution to the trust created as a result of the FAIR Act would be less than its 
payout to the personal injury claimants in class 7, resulting in more assets in the 
estate to be distributed to general unsecured creditors.  Armstrong’s mandatory 
contribution to the trust created by FAIR was estimated to range from $520 million 
to $805 million, while Armstrong’s contribution to such a trust under the plan was 
over $1.8 billion in cash, notes, and common stock in the reorganized debtor.  In re 
Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510. 
 402. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510. 
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neither the debtor nor the court was willing to extend the date of the 
hearing to consider confirmation of the Armstrong Plan.403 
As of the voting deadline, all impaired classes voted to accept the 
Armstrong Plan, except Class 6.404  Although the requisite majority of 
Class 6 claims in number voted to accept the plan (88.03%), less than 
the requisite two-thirds in amount of Class 6 claims voted to accept 
the plan (23.21%).405  In addition, the Unsecured Creditors filed a 
timely objection to the Armstrong Plan, arguing, among other things, 
that (1) the Armstrong Plan should not be confirmed until the fate of 
the FAIR Act was determined, and (2) the Armstrong Plan could not 
be confirmed over their objection, as it could not satisfy the 
cramdown requirements of § 1129(b).406 
B.  Court Rejection of the Armstrong Plan 
After an extended hearing, the bankruptcy court issued proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a proposed confirmation 
order, and a recommendation to the district court that the 
Unsecured Creditors’ objection be overruled and the Armstrong Plan 
be confirmed.407  The Unsecured Creditors filed at the district court 
                                                          
 403. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 528 & n.10.  In any event, as noted by 
the district court, “[w]hile both the parties’ perceptions of whether legislation would 
help or hinder their respective positions and of the likelihood that the legislation 
would be enacted may have influenced their decision to support or oppose the Plan, 
these political calculations have no bearing on the legal issues before the Court.”  Id. 
at 528. 
 404. See id. at 528 (recounting that Classes 3, 7, and 12 voted to accept the plan, 
while Class 6 voted to reject it). 
 405. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000) 
(“A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors . . . 
that hold at least two third in amount and more than one-half in number of the 
allowed claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such 
plan.”). 
 406. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510 (stating that the Unsecured 
Creditors’ objection was based on (1) the perceived consequences of the proposed 
FAIR Act, and (2) the applicability of the Absolute Priority Rule). 
 407. Id.  The bankruptcy court indicated that because the plan included a 
channeling injunction under § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, it did not have 
jurisdiction to enter a final order confirming the plan; rather, it could only issue 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.  Brief of 
Appellee Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Armstrong World Indus., Inc. et 
al., at 11, In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 05-
1881) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A) (2000) (providing that a channeling 
injunction shall be valid if an order confirming the plan “was issued or affirmed by 
the district court that has jurisdiction over the reorganization case”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c)(1), which states: 
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but 
that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.  In such proceeding, the 
bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by 
the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings 
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objections to the bankruptcy court’s findings, conclusions, and 
recommendation.408  After holding a hearing, the district court 
denied confirmation, holding that the Plan violated the Absolute 
Priority Rule.409  The Third Circuit affirmed.410 
The Third Circuit began its statutory construction and analysis by 
referring to the words of the statute, noting that “[i]f the meaning is 
plain, we will make no further inquiry unless the literal application of 
the statute will end in a result that conflicts with Congress’s 
intentions.”411  The court stressed that the intentions of Congress 
control.412  The court then stated that the plain language of the 
statute made it clear that “a plan cannot give property to junior 
claimants over the objection of a more senior class that is impaired,” 
and that nothing in the legislative history demonstrates that such 
plain meaning conflicts with Congress’s intent.413 
The Court of Appeals then rejected Armstrong’s argument that the 
gifting provided for in the plan is permissible under the precedents 
established in SPM, MCorp., and Genesis.  Without much explanation, 
the appellate court adopted the district court’s interpretation of 
those cases and agreed that “they do not stand for the unconditional 
proposition that creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish 
with the bankruptcy proceeds they receive.”414 
The district court had addressed those cases in a section entitled 
“Cases That Do Not Strictly Apply Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) Are 
Distinguishable or Wrongly Decided.”415  After a detailed discussion of 
SPM, the court held that SPM was inapposite to the Armstrong Plan 
for various reasons.  First, SPM occurred in a Chapter 7 case, where 
the Absolute Priority Rule does not apply.416  Second, because SPM 
involved a secured creditor with a perfected, first priority lien in 
                                                          
and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any 
party has timely and specifically objected. 
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 
 408. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 510). 
 409. Id. at 510-11. 
 410. Id. at 518. 
 411. Id. at 512. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. at 513.  Armstrong had argued that the statements of the bill’s sponsors 
that a senior creditor shall not be able to give up consideration to a junior class over 
the objection of an “intervening class” meant that gifting was proper when a senior 
class gives up consideration to a junior class over the objection of a co-equal (rather 
than intervening) class.  Id.  The court rejected this argument as contrary to the plain 
meaning of the statute and to other statements in the legislative history.  See id. 
(concluding that the plain language of the statute and legislative history do “not 
indicate that the objecting class must be an intervening class”). 
 414. Id. at 514. 
 415. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 537 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 416. Id. at 538. 
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almost all of the debtor’s assets, which were sold, the proceeds were 
not subject to distribution under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
scheme (section 726 for Chapter 7 cases).417  The district court 
disagreed with those courts that have held that the collateral security 
of secured creditors is not property of the estate.418 
Third, the sharing agreement in SPM was akin to an ordinary 
carveout.419  “Unlike the Debtor in the instant case, the secured 
lender in SPM had a substantive right to dispose of its property, 
including the right to share the proceeds subject to its lien with other 
classes.”420 
The district court also distinguished WorldCom, Genesis, and MCorp.  
It noted accurately that WorldCom involved distributions between 
classes of equal priority (a question of the Unfair Discrimination 
Prohibition), which did not implicate the Absolute Priority Rule.421  
This is a weak distinction, because either a gift or transfer of value 
from one creditor class to another constitutes plan treatment or it 
does not.  If it does, as the Armstrong court appears to believe, then 
such a gift would implicate the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition just 
as much as it would implicate the Absolute Priority Rule.  The 
WorldCom court apparently believed such a gift did not constitute 
plan treatment and, therefore, did not implicate either the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition or the Absolute Priority Rule. 
The court distinguished Genesis asserting that the distribution to 
equity holders through the management incentive plan involved an 
acceptable carveout from the secured creditor’s recovery.422 
                                                          
 417. Id. at 538 & n.29. 
 418. See id. at 538 (reasoning that the agreement between the secured lender and 
the unsecured creditors involved property of the estate).  The court cited § 541 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, id. at 538 n.28, which defines property of the estate to include 
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).  The court was correct, as even SPM noted 
that property subject to the secured lender’s lien is property of the estate until that 
property is distributed to the secured lender.  See Official, Unsecured Creditors 
Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993) (where 
the court stated: 
In this case, the proceeds of the sale of SPM’s assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363 were property of the estate and thus the Code governed their use and 
distribution.  However, once the court lifted the automatic stay and ordered 
those proceeds distributed to [the secured creditor] in proper satisfaction of 
its lien, that money became property of [the secured creditor], not of the 
estate). 
 419. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 538-39. 
 420. Id. at 539 (emphasis added). 
 421. Id. 
 422. See id. (reasoning that because the property distributed to the junior class in 
Genesis was subject to senior lenders’ liens, it did not violate the Absolute Priority 
Rule) (citing Genesis, 266 B.R. 591, 617-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)). 
MILLER 6/28/2006  9:15:42 PM 
1418 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1345 
The court’s distinction of MCorp. was even weaker, noting that the 
distribution approved in that case was made “to fund settlement of 
pre-petition litigation between the debtor and a third party.”423  After 
spending pages describing the importance of a strict application of 
the Absolute Priority Rule, the district court in Armstrong did not 
adequately justify why a diversion of consideration to junior 
stakeholders to resolve litigation is an appropriate exception to the 
Absolute Priority Rule while a gift from another creditor is not. 
Apparently recognizing that its distinctions of the above cases were 
weak, the district court in Armstrong suggested that those cases are 
wrongly decided.  According to the court, 
to the extent that In re WorldCom, In re Genesis Health Ventures, and In 
re MCorp Financial read SPM to stand for the unconditional 
proposition that ‘creditors are generally free to do whatever they 
wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including sharing 
them with other creditors, so long as recoveries received under the 
plan are not impacted,’ . . . without adherence to the strictures of 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), that contention is flatly rejected 
here.424 
The both the district and circuit courts in Armstrong unequivocally 
rejected the strong policy arguments in favor of permitting the 
structure in the Armstrong Plan to enable the reorganization of 
Armstrong and its emergence from Chapter 11.  According to the 
district court, “no amount of legal creativity or counsel’s incantation 
to general notions of equity or to any supposed policy favoring 
reorganizations . . . supports judicial rewriting of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”425  The Court of Appeals endorsed the district court’s flat 
rejection of a liberal construction of the Bankruptcy Code in order to 
achieve its objective of successful business reorganization.426  It added 
its own death blow to liberal construction, stating that “[a]llowing 
this particular type of transfer would encourage parties to 
impermissibly sidestep the carefully crafted strictures of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and would undermine Congress’s intention to give 
unsecured creditors bargaining power in this context.”427 
                                                          
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 539-40 (quoting WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, *59, 174-75 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2003); citing In re Sentry Operating Co., 264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2001); citing In re Snyders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 896 n.11 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2004)). 
 425. Id. at 540. 
 426. Cf. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507, 514 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (adopting the district court’s interpretation of SPM, Genesis, and Mcorp.). 
 427. Id. at 514-15. 
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C.  The Danger of the Armstrong Decision 
The Third Circuit’s decision was wrong both from a statutory and 
policy perspective.  The bottom line is that no one would have been 
harmed by the proposed gifting in Armstrong.  The rejecting class was 
not entitled to the value that was to be transferred to the equity 
holder.  As a result, it should have had no right to hold up 
confirmation on the basis of the value being provided by one class to 
another.  Under the Armstrong Plan that was denied confirmation, 
the Class 6 Unsecured Creditors were going to receive a distribution 
worth approximately 59.5% of their claims.428  If Armstrong amended 
its plan based upon the Third Circuit’s decision and removed the gift 
of the warrants to equity absent a different agreement among the 
parties, Class 6 would receive approximately 59.5% of its claims—the 
exact same amount as originally proposed.429 
Significantly, Class 6 would have no basis under which to object to 
the warrants being distributed to and retained by Class 7.  This is 
because under the plan, Class 7 is estimated to recover twenty 
percent of its claims.430  If Class 7 kept the warrants, the recovery to 
Class 7 would still be well under thirty percent431—substantially less 
than the nearly sixty percent recovery being provided to the equal 
                                                          
 428. Id. at 509. 
   429.   In fact, after the Armstrong II decision, the district court entered a 
scheduling order, dated February 8, 2006 (the “Armstrong Scheduling Order”) 
(upon joint motion of Armstrong, the Unsecured Creditors, the Asbestos PI 
Claimants, and others) requiring Armstrong to file a modified plan by February 21, 
2006 and scheduling the hearing to consider confirmation of the modified 
Armstrong Plan for May 23, 2006.  In re Armstrong World Indus, Inc., Chapter 11 
Case No.:  00-4471 (JKF) (Bankr. D. Del.), docket # 9060.  The Armstrong 
Scheduling Order provided that, apart from certain technical modifications, the 
Armstrong Plan “shall only be modified to delete the provisions regarding the 
receipt of ‘New Warrants’ by the holders of Equity Interests in Class 12 of the 
[Armstrong] Plan.”  Id.  It further provided that the Unsecured Creditors 
acknowledge that the sole objection they will be pursuing is that the Armstrong Plan 
discriminates unfairly with respect to Class 6 (by overestimating Armstrong’s asbestos 
personal injury liability and thus allocating too much of its assets to Class 7).  Id.  The 
Armstrong Scheduling Order further set forth a discovery schedule relating to the 
Unsecured Creditors’ objection.  Id.  The district court held the confirmation 
hearing on May 23-25, 2006.  Subsequent to the hearing, on May 30, 2006, the 
district court entered a post-trial scheduling order requiring the parties to submit 
post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by certain dates 
and ordering that closing arguments shall be held on July 11, 2006.  Id.  Therefore, 
as of the date of the publication of this Article, a chapter 11 plan for Armstrong has 
not been confirmed.  Armstrong remains in chapter 11.  Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. The warrants, estimated to be worth $35 to $40 million, amounted to 1.1%-
1.3% of Class 7’s $3.146 billion in claims.  Cf. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 
525 (providing a figure for Class 7’s claims).  Thus, if Class 7 had retained the 
warrants, its recovery would have been approximately 21% of its claims. 
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priority Class 6.432  Class 6 could not, therefore, assert that the plan 
violated the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition with respect to Class 6 
(and, in fact, Class 6 conceded that point).433 
The facts of Armstrong demonstrate why gifting may be both 
voluntary and non-prejudicial.  A class that is discriminated against by 
not receiving as much under the plan as a class of equal priority, has 
a right to reject the plan and oppose its confirmation under the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.434  Class 7, therefore, could have 
rejected the Armstrong Plan and opposed confirmation (regardless 
of the whether or not claimants in the class received the warrants, as 
they were receiving less than Class 6).  Class 7 not only accepted the 
plan, but agreed to give a portion of its own distribution to others.435  
The gifting structure of Armstrong was feasible because of Class 7’s 
voluntary agreement to give up to the equity holder a portion of its 
recovery (i.e., the warrants). 
Once it is conceded that Class 7 was entitled to the warrants, it is 
somewhat illogical to say that Class 7 cannot transfer those warrants 
to Class 12 equity as part of the plan implementation.  Clearly, a Class 
7 claimant could, on its own after the plan became effective and it 
received the warrants, gift them to the equity holder.  If the Class 7 
claimant can make that distribution at a future date, it should be 
allowed to do so through the plan.  To hold otherwise would be to 
elevate form over substance. 
Therefore, a clear and distinct conclusion can be drawn between 
what is permissible and what is impermissible:  if the gift is an amount 
to which the gifting class is entitled (such that the objecting class is 
no worse off as a result of the gift), it should be permitted.436 
The Armstrong Court’s holding either leaves professionals without 
clear guidance or draws a formalistic line of demarcation:  if the 
transfer is after the effective date of a plan, it’s fine; if the transfer is 
                                                          
 432. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509. 
 433. Brief of Appellant, supra note 389, at 29-30. 
 434. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2000) (providing an impaired class with a right to 
reject a plan in the confirmation process). 
 435. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509-10 (explaining that if Class 7 
received the warrants under the plan, it would automatically waive receipt of them, 
and that Class 7 accepted the plan). 
 436. The answer would be different if the distribution in the hands of the gifting 
class would violate the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.  Thus, in Armstrong II, the 
court should have considered whether it would have been improper (due to the 
Absolute Priority Rule, the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, or otherwise) for Class 
7 to retain the warrants.  Once the court made the determination that it would not 
be improper for Class 7 to keep the distribution, it should have held that it was not 
improper for Class 7 to gift the distribution—regardless of the identity of the 
recipient. 
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under a plan, it’s improper; if the value transferred comes from the 
collateral security of a secured creditor, it’s fine; if the value 
transferred is not collateral proceeds of a secured creditor, it’s 
improper, etc.  The Armstrong decision essentially limits the ability of 
debtors and parties in interest to find ways in Chapter 11 to achieve 
the mutually advantageous goal of reorganization and return to the 
economic world simply because a party that does not suffer as a result is 
able to assert a technical objection as to the form of the other parties’ 
recovery.  The decision adds grist to the mill of dissidents to frustrate 
the objectives of Chapter 11. 
The facts in Armstrong illustrate the point.  The creditors’ 
committee (Class 6) was not truly opposed to equity receiving the 
warrants—the committee had agreed to that granting of value.437  The 
Unsecured Creditors subsequently changed their mind about the 
plan, because they perceived an increase in the likelihood of the 
passage of the FAIR Act, which, in their view, would have lowered the 
recovery to Class 7 and provided Class 6 with a greater recovery,438 a 
rationale unrelated to the transfer of value to Class 12, the equity 
holder.  The Absolute Priority Rule objection raised by the 
Unsecured Creditors appears almost as an afterthought.439  The 
distribution to equity had nothing to do with the reason the 
Unsecured Creditors were opposed to the plan. 
Had the agreement the Unsecured Creditors reached with the 
other parties in Armstrong not included the distribution to equity, it 
appears they still would have changed their position in the fall of 
2003 based on the possible passage of the FAIR Act.440  The proposed 
distribution to equity only gave the Unsecured Creditors a formal 
statutory basis (pretext) on which to interpose an objection.  This 
reliance on the Absolute Priority Rule—to kill a way out of Chapter 
11 for reasons that had nothing to do with the statutory basis for the 
objection (provision of warrants to equity)—certainly has no basis in 
                                                          
 437. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510 (stating that the creditors’ 
committee, which represented Class 6, initially approved of the plan in May 2003). 
 438. See supra notes 400-401 and accompanying text (explaining that, according to 
the Unsecured Creditors, passage of the FAIR Act was likely because the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had approved it, and Armstrong’s contribution to the trust 
created by the Act would have been less than its payout to the Class 7 asbestos injury 
claimants under the plan, making more money available for the Unsecured 
Creditors). 
 439. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510 (discussing, in detail, the 
anticipated effects of the FAIR Act as the unsecured creditors’ first objection to the 
plan, and briefly mentioning the “possible applicability of the absolute priority rule” 
as their second objection). 
 440. Cf. supra note 439 and accompanying text (portraying the anticipated effects 
of the Fair Act as the Unsecured Creditors’ primary objection to the plan). 
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the history of the development of the Absolute Priority Rule.  The 
result in Armstrong merely encourages dissidents to interpose 
technical objections in order to extract hold up value.441 
The foregoing can be demonstrated with an example.  Assume a 
debtor has assets with a value of $60.  The debtor has the following 
creditors with the following claims:  (1) Secured Class ($20), (2) Class 
A ($40), and (3) Class B ($80). 
This debtor is clearly insolvent.  Under a typical scenario, the 
debtor’s $60 of value would be allocated as follows:  (1) Secured 
Class—$20 (100%), (2) Class A—$13 (33%), (3) Class B—$27 (33%), 
and (4) Equity—$0. 
If either Class A or Class B (but not both) rejects the plan, the plan 
could be confirmed over the class’ objection, as there is no unfair 
discrimination (the equal priority classes are getting the same 
recovery) and there is no violation of the Absolute Priority Rule (as 
equity is not receiving a distribution). 
Assume Class B wants equity to get a recovery.  This could be for 
many reasons:  Class B could be the new owners of the reorganized 
debtor and believe that the former shareholders (who are also the 
management of the debtor) would add more value to the 
reorganized enterprise if they received a recovery.  Class B also could 
believe that providing equity with a recovery will expedite the 
debtor’s Chapter 11 case and avoid lengthy or costly litigation.  The 
reason does not really matter.442  To achieve its desired outcome, 
                                                          
 441. Of course, to take away Class 6’s leverage, Class 7 could have insisted that the 
distribution of warrants to equity only occur if all impaired classes accepted the plan, 
but this would not have achieved Class 7’s goal of providing a recovery to equity.  
However, the result in Armstrong instructs parties such as Class 7 in the future that if 
they agree to a plan providing value to equity when creditors are not paid in full, 
they should make the distribution to equity conditioned on acceptance by all senior 
classes so that the plan can be confirmed under § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code if 
a senior class rejects it. 
 442. Although one could argue that the reason does matter because, for example, 
value for future management is not “on account of” management’s old equity 
interests.  See generally supra pp. 1358-69 (discussing the New Value Corollary, an 
exception to the Absolute Priority Rule that permits a distribution to equity holders 
on the grounds that the distribution is not being given to them on account of their 
equity interests, but for new value being contributed by them).  This argument would 
fail because sweat equity does not comply with the requirements of the New Value 
Corollary.  See supra pp. 1373-74 (explaining that in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 
485 U.S. 197 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that the New Value Corollary does 
not include a promise to contribute “labor, experience, and expertise” to the 
reorganized entity). 
In addition, for purposes of this example, the reason does not matter.  Even if the 
creditors in Class B wanted to give a distribution to certain stockholders because of 
the stockholders’ beauty (and they like having beautiful shareholders), the result 
should be the same. 
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Class B could decide that it is willing to give $3 of its distribution of 
$27 to equity. 
The recoveries would now be as follows:  (1) Secured Class—$20 
(100%), (2) Class A—$13 (33%), (3) Class B—$24 (30%), and 
(4) Equity—$3. 
Class B could reject the plan and decide it does not want to make 
the gift to equity.  This plan could not then be confirmed.  If Class B 
consents, however, the plan should be confirmed, as it is clear that 
Class B is voluntarily transferring value to which it is otherwise 
entitled.443  Under this scenario, to enable Class A to hold up 
confirmation of the plan on the basis that it violates the Absolute 
Priority Rule is counterproductive to the reorganization and the 
interests of other stakeholders.  Class A should be indifferent as 
between the plan where equity gets a gift and the plan where equity 
does not get a gift.  In either case, Class A gets thirty-three percent.  
Nothing in the history or the policy of the Absolute Priority Rule is 
intended to protect Class A in this situation.  Class A is using its 
position for hold up value.  It is saying:  “Class B, if you want to give 
equity $3, you must give us something too.”  This gives Class A too 
much leverage to extract value from others and delay emergence. 
The same example can be used to demonstrate that the gifting 
strategy cannot be abused by debtors or stockholders as some have 
suggested.  Assume the debtor is the party wanting to provide a 
recovery for equity.  Therefore, it allocates its value as follows:  
(1) Secured Class—$20 (100%), (2) Class A—$12 (30%), (3) Class 
B—$24 (30%), and (4) Equity—$4. 
If Class A and Class B both accept the plan, then there is no issue.  
The Absolute Priority Rule only applies in the cramdown situation 
(i.e., where there is a rejecting class).444  If either Class A or Class B 
rejects the plan, this plan cannot be confirmed, because it would 
violate the Absolute Priority Rule.  Assume Class A rejects and Class B 
accepts.  An argument by the debtor or Class B that the distribution 
was actually a gift from Class B would not work.  This is because 
distributing the $4 to Class B to then gift to equity would provide 
Class B with a recovery of $28 (thirty-five percent).  Class A could 
                                                          
 443. Class B could do this outside of a plan. Cf. supra pp. 1344-45 (reasoning that a 
class entitled to recovery under a plan could, once the plan becomes effective and it 
receives its recovery, gift part of its recovery to an equity holder once, unless Class B 
is widely disbursed and/or not yet even identified (for example, the Armstrong Class 7 
potential asbestos personal injury claimants)). 
 444. See supra pp. 1355-56 (stating that because the Absolute Priority Rule is 
contained § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, it only applies to nonconsensual 
plans). 
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then assert a meritorious objection that the distribution to Class B 
violates the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition. 
This example illustrates that gifting is not bound to be the norm, 
because it can only be practiced as a voluntary distribution from one 
group to another.  No class can be forced to gift against its will, and 
the objecting class should never be harmed by the gift.  The gift is 
inherently something that the gifting class is entitled to receive and is 
voluntarily distributing to another party.445  Arguably, this gives the 
debtor too much leverage to hold up the plan process to demand a 
“gift” for equity.  However, this position may always be asserted by a 
debtor.  The debtor can always tell both classes that it may not 
propose a plan that does not provide a recovery to equity.  The classes 
can decide to accept the plan anyway, and it can be confirmed under 
§ 1129(a).  Alternatively, one or more creditors may file a motion 
seeking to terminate the debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan on the 
basis that the debtor is using exclusivity as a sword rather than a 
shield.446  If exclusivity is terminated, any party can file a plan that 
extinguishes equity.447 
                                                          
 445. Some might argue that the increased ability to “make a deal” is not worth the 
inefficiency it introduces into the capital markets, and that the markets might have to 
factor in uncertainty as to whether a claim will be diluted by a junior claim or 
interest.  This concern is, for the most part, misplaced.  No claim is diluted unless the 
class voluntarily agrees to forgo its distribution.  The class can always insist on the full 
amount to which it is entitled.  The concern is not, however, entirely misplaced.  If 
gifting is readily permitted, an individual creditor could be forced, by virtue of the 
democratic class voting mechanism, to gift a portion of its recovery if the majority of 
the class accepts.  But, once again, this situation is not unique to gifting.  If all 
impaired creditor classes accept a plan, equity can receive a distribution, the 
minority dissenting creditors notwithstanding.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2000) 
(providing that a plan should be confirmed if certain requirements are met, 
including acceptance by impaired classes). 
 446. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is granted the exclusive right to file 
a plan in the first 120 days of a Chapter 11 case.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2000).  The 
period can be extended by the debtor or shortened by another party in interest for 
cause.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(1) (2000).  Under the recent amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code, for Chapter 11 cases filed on or after October 17, 2005, the 
debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan may not be extended beyond 18 months from 
the entry of the order for relief.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A) (2005).  After the 
debtor’s exclusive period has terminated (or been terminated), any party in interest 
can file a plan.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2000).  A finding that the debtor is using 
exclusivity to pressure creditors to accede to its reorganization demands constitutes 
cause for terminating exclusivity.  See In re Situation Mgmt. Sys., 252 B.R. 859, 863 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (asserting that a debtor’s use of exclusivity to force creditors 
to accept an otherwise unacceptable plan is one factor courts consider when 
determining cause); see also In re McLean Indus., Inc., 87 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that courts also consider whether creditors have an 
opportunity to review and negotiate an acceptable plan, and whether they are 
provided with substantial financial information about any proposed plan so that they 
can make an informed decision). 
 447. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (providing that “any party in interest” can file a plan 
after the exclusivity period). 
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In addition to risking loss of exclusivity, the debtor does not truly 
have the power to force any class to make a gift, because that class 
would necessarily, as explained above, have to accept less than that to 
which it was entitled.  Each class would prefer that the other class 
make the gift.  The result is either that no class makes the gift or that 
both agree that equity gets a recovery (which, as noted, gives the 
debtor or equity no greater leverage than it has under existing law to 
demand a recovery for equity in a consensual plan). 
The best, and perhaps the only, argument supporting the decision 
in Armstrong is that the Bankruptcy Code is unambiguous and does 
not permit a recovery to equity under a cramdown plan—gifting or 
not.448  The same argument could be made against the New Value 
Corollary.  Yet, the Supreme Court has already suggested that the 
New Value Corollary to the Absolute Priority Rule has vitality, even 
though it is not expressly authorized in the words of the Bankruptcy 
Code.449  Gifting should be permitted for the same reasons.  
Distributions that are made on account of new value being 
contributed or through gifting by other stakeholders are not really 
exceptions to the Absolute Priority Rule (or the Unfair 
Discrimination Prohibition); they are merely distributions outside of 
the scope of those provisions.  Moreover, as such distributions do not 
implicate the concerns underlying the Absolute Priority Rule and the 
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, there may be no substantive 
reason to disallow them.  To the contrary, there are very good policy 
reasons to allow these creative structures and solutions to effective 
reorganization plans.  Therefore, to the extent that such creativity is 
                                                          
If the debtor, an equity holder, or another party tries to use the gifting doctrine to 
extract value in a manner constituting bad faith or that is otherwise contrary to the 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, there are other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code 
that can be used by others to combat such conduct.  E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) 
(2000) (providing that in order to confirm a plan, a court must find that the plan has 
been proposed in good faith). 
 448. Cf. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (applying the plain meaning of the Absolute Priority Rule to affirm the 
district court’s decision to deny confirmation of the Armstrong Plan). 
 449. See supra pp. 1376-82 (explaining that, in Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n 
v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), the Supreme Court concluded that 
the New Value Corollary could arguably be implied from the language of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and that if it were implied, consideration given to former equity 
holders in exchange for new value would be subject to a “market” test).  Moreover, 
the fact that the New Value Corollary is generally accepted, see supra pp. 1376-82, 
even though language explicitly setting forth the New Value Corollary was 
introduced but rejected by Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, see Bank of 
Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 446-47, is further proof that similar 
arguments relating to the gifting doctrine are not determinative.  Thus, In re 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507, should not bar its 
acceptance. 
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blunted by blind adherence to strict construction of the statute, a 
legislative remedy should be obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy negotiations are unlike any other in the sense that they 
are rarely bilateral.  Rather, they are multilateral, with many parties 
with diverse interests pulling in different directions with the debtor 
the cynosure of all parties’ attentions.  Although consensus might 
appear unachievable under such circumstances, the advantage of 
Chapter 11 is that it creates a framework and tools that parties may 
use to reach a consensus.  By its nature, consensus is often a middle 
ground—no party will ever walk away from the process achieving 
everything it wanted.  Permitting gifting of the sort approved by the 
courts in MCorp., Genesis, and WorldCom (but rejected by the court in 
Armstrong) opened up the boundaries within which parties could 
achieve the objectives of Chapter 11 and not allow hold-outs to 
dominate and possibly cause harm to the reorganization effort and 
the debtor’s estate.  In those extremely complicated cases, innovative 
creative solutions should be applauded.  It is in such situations that 
bankruptcy professionals add value.  The value added should be 
recognized by the courts and evaluated in perspective of the policies 
and objectives of Chapter 11. 
